'Ought' and Ability

Abstract

A principle that many have found attractive is one that goes by the name “'Ought' Implies 'Can'.” According to this principle, one morally ought to do something only if one can do it. This essay has two goals: to show that the principle is false and to undermine the motivations that have been offered for it. Toward the end, a proposal about moral obligation according to which something like a restricted version of 'Ought' Implies 'Can' is true is floated. Though no full-fledged argument for this proposal is offered, that it fits with a rather natural and intuitive picture of the structure of morality and seems to explain certain salient features of the debate over whether the principle is true, goes some way toward recommending it.

The Best Argument for “Ought Implies Can” Is a Better Argument Against “Ought Implies Can”

“…The idea that unfulfillable obligations might guide in some or all of the ways I discuss in this section has been advanced by other authors, such as Brown (1977), Marcus (1980), SinnottArmstrong (1984), Heuer (2010), and Graham (2011). Perhaps the most widely discussed unfulfillable obligations in the literature on OIC are obligations which an agent makes herself unable to fulfill. To adapt an example from Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1984), imagine that Carrie makes a promise to pick Mindy up at noon.…”

“…If OIC is true, then in 13. See Graham (2011) for a discussion of just how complex disjunctive theories might have to be to properly account for certain kinds of robust action guidance. note that his arguments about complexity don't make use of the doubling up problem, which suggests that he is underestimating how complex disjunctive theories will have to be.…”

“…23 But it will be more helpful to us to consider a DOEr view that does bring in additional complexity to deal with the overguidance problem. This view is suggested by Peter Graham (2011). The view distinguishes between negative and positive duties.…”

Will the Real Principles of Justice Please Stand Up?

“…Consider the dictum that "ought implies can": what one ought to do depends on what one can (in some sense) do (e.g., Vranas 2007; but see Graham 2011).…”

Psychology and the Aims of Normative Ethics

“…Williams (1985: 121-131) argues that the linguistic formulation does not clarify matters. 19 Though see (Graham 2011) for a recent opposed view. 20 (Flanagan 1993: 32).…”