Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent

Abstract

While past research has demonstrated widespread compliance in the Courts of Appeals with Supreme Court precedent (e.g., Gruhl 1980; Songer 1987; Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994; Songer and Sheehan 1990), compliance is not automatic and is surely political. We examine compliance with Supreme Court overrulings of precedent—cases in which we might expect the lowest levels of compliance with Supreme Court policy prescriptions. We argue that several variables are relevant to the compliance decision and that those variables fall into two broad categories: characteristics of the Supreme Court precedent and characteristics of the circuit applying the precedent. In our event history analysis, we find that both precedent and circuit characteristics determine whether, and how quickly, a circuit follows a Supreme Court decision that overrules existing precedent; that is, unanimity, complexity, and the age of the overruled precedent, as well as the likelihood of Supreme Court review, are related to the compliance decision. While the Courts of Appeals adopt alterations in Supreme Court precedent rather quickly (within one or two relevant decisions), these factors exert some influence on that speed.

Strategic Anticipation and the Hierarchy of Justice in U.S. District Courts

“…As Canon and Johnson (1999, p. 30) state, "all courts lower in the hierarchy must attempt to apply the policy to relevant cases, interpreting the policy as necessary to fit the circumstances at hand." Several scholars examined lower court treatment of legal precedents and concluded that inferior judges generally adhere to Supreme Court pronouncements of law (Benesh & Reddick, 2002;Gruhl, 1980;Johnson, 1987;Songer & Sheehan, 1990), and lower court judges tend to follow ideological trends from these higher tribunals (Baum, 1980;Songer, 1987). According to Baum (1997), the reason for compliance by lower court judges is that while those judges seek to set doctrine near their personal ideal points, they realize that doing so may increase the chance of being reversed by a higher court.…”

Social Interactions and the Content of Legal Opinions

“…First, only "ticketed" judges can be chosen. 7 Second, whenever possible, allocation follows the "cab-rank principle". As judges dispose of their cases, they join the back of the rank and wait to receive a new case; as a case requiring a panel of size n arrives, the CA Civ Listing…”

Competing Constraints: State Court Responses to Supreme Court Decisions and Legislation on Wages and Hours

“…The findings provide important evidence about the importance of competing constraints on state supreme court decisionmaking. 1976Benesh and Reddick 2002;Canon and Johnson 1999;Songer, Segal and Cameron 1994).…”

“…Explanations for this fear typically refer to the reputation costs associated with being overturned by the Supreme Court (Baum 1976(Baum , 1978Benesh and Reddick 2002;Canon and Johnson 1999;Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994). Thus, Supreme Court decisions are typically implemented by these lower court judges, especially as the probability of review increases (Baum 1976(Baum , 1978(Baum , 1980Benesh and Reddick 2002;Songer and Sheehan 1990;Johnson and Canon 1984;Songer, Segal and Cameron 1994;Songer and Tabrizi 1999). However, since much of the extant research does not explicitly examine state court decisions on state legislation, it is not entirely clear whether the general pattern will emerge as strongly or at all.…”