“…This prediction is rooted in established agency arguments suggesting that labor productivity is at least partially a function of both moral hazards, such as misaligned interests between owners and managers, and adverse selection, such as from hiring from a suboptimal talent pool (Akerlof, 1970;Eisenhardt, 1989;Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In conjunction with recent arguments from the family business (Chrisman et al, 2017;Cucculelli, Mannarino, Pupo, & Ricotta, 2014) and finance (Barth et al, 2005;Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003) literatures, we suggest that these problems are particularly severe in family firms. Moral hazards are rampant given the diverging interests of family owners and their nonfamily employees (Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009;Schulze et al, 2001).…”