Ownership Patterns and Control in Turkish Listed Companies

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to document the prevalent ownership concentration, structure and control in the top 100 companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. The results are discussed in the context of emerging corporate governance trends in Turkey. Where appropriate, comparisons with other countries are provided. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003.

Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance on the Budapest Stock Exchange: Do Too Many Cooks Spoil the Goulash?

“…among Fortune 500 companies, suggesting that a significant minority of large firms may have such an ownership structure, and Gomes and Novaes (2001) Turkey (Demirag and Serter, 2003) finds an average stake of 45.1 percent for the largest owner and 64.5 for the largest five, again implying that multiple blockholding is an empirically significant phenomenon. Our results in this paper suggest that the interactions among these owners may also be economically significant in their effects on corporate performance.…”

“…10 These measures have 8 Becht and Röell (1999) report the median largest voting block at 20 percent in France (on the CAC40); 34 percent in Spain; 43.5 percent in the Netherlands; 45-55 percent in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Italy; only 9.9 percent for the United Kingdom; and less than 5 percent for both the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. As noted above, Demirag and Serter (2003) Table 2 contains summary statistics for these variables. Both ROE and OE exhibit substantial variation in their growth and levels, as shown by the large standard deviations.…”

Ownership patterns and control of top 100 Malaysian listed companies

“…Whereas, golden shares allow government to direct firms' strategic decisions for instance, nominate the board directors. Previous literature reports that wedge improve controller incentive and ability to maximize their interest at the expenses of minority shareholders and this kind of agency conflicts known as Type II Agency Problem [5,10]. This study recommends regulator and policy maker to operationalize and introduce new measurement of corporate governance in order to offer a protected environment for minority shareholders.…”

Corporate Governance Rating and Ownership Structure in the Case of Turkey

“…Another view, known as the theory of private benefits of control [43], argues that the disincentive of foreign investors to improve corporate governance might be due to the fact that they receive potential private benefits with relative ease when corporate governance is weak. 4 Testing whether either one of these theories hold in practice is an empirical project. There are studies that have looked at this relationship in developed market economies such as [52,53] and we can mention others who studied the linkage on emerging market settings such as [3,8,54], among others.…”

“…However, family members remain actively involved in strategic and even daily decisions [3]. The cash flow and voting rights in Turkish companies are also "relatively more aligned compared to other family-ownership-dominated insider-system countries" as Demirag and Serter [4] pointed out. As shown by Yıldırım et al [5], 20% of board positions and an additional 47% of directors of Turkish corporations are salaried managers employed by the holding firm or in firms controlled by the same family.…”