Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments

Brickley, James A.; Lease, Ronald C.; Smith, Clifford W.

doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90047-5

Cited by 1,355 publications

(990 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Gorton and Kahl (1999) In studying the adoption of antitakeover amendments Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Parrino (2000) provide evidence consistent with the hypotheses of Gorton and Kahl (1999) and Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988). Specifically, Borokhovich, Brunarski and Parrino find that the relation between announcement date abnormal returns and the percentage of outside blockholdings depends on the identity of the blockholder.…”

Section: Theory and Evidencementioning

confidence: 56%

Institutional Investors, Corporate Ownership and Corporate Governance: Global Perspectives

Gillan¹,

Starks²

2003

Ownership and Governance of Enterprises

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We examine the role of institutional investors in financial markets and in corporate governance. In many countries, institutional investors have become the predominant players in financial markets and their influence worldwide is growing, chiefly due to the privatization and development of pension fund systems. Moreover, foreign institutional investors are becoming a significant presence, bringing their trading habits and corporate governance preferences to international markets. In fact, we argue that the primary actors prompting change in many corporate governance systems are institutional investors, often foreign institutional investors. In other countries the role of institutional investors is limited. Instead, large blockholders, often in the form of individuals, family groups, other corporations, or lending institutions are the dominant players. We present the theoretical arguments for the involvement of investors in shareholder monitoring and a brief history of institutional ownership and activism in the United States and other countries. We also discuss studies of the efficacy of such activism.We then examine differences in ownership structures around the world and the implications of the interactions of these ownership structures for institutional investor involvement in corporate governance. Although there may be some convergence in corporate governance systems across countries, because of the endogenous nature of the interrelation among the factors of corporate governance the evolution will most likely .../…

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Section: Theory and Evidencementioning

confidence: 56%

Institutional Investors, Corporate Ownership and Corporate Governance: Global Perspectives

Gillan¹,

Starks²

2003

Ownership and Governance of Enterprises

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“…Union pension funds are also extremely active through the media (Schwab and Thomas 1998) and have been successful in influencing regulatory reform (Davis and Kim 2007;Bainbridge 2006). 3 In particular, mutual funds and private pension funds have been found to be effective monitors of management (Brickley et al 1988;Borokhovich et al 2006;Agrawal and Mandelkar 1990;Chen, Harford, and Li 2007;Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach 1998).…”

Section: Fidelitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See Petersen (2009) Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Zeckhauser and Pound (1990), Black (1992), Brickley et al(1988, Agrawal and Mandelkar (1990), Borokhovich et al (2006), Chen, Harford, …”

Section: Fidelitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting

Agrawal

2011

Rev. Financ. Stud.

177

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“…However, it is also argued that banks may be locked in a lending relationship which may weaken their ability to in ‡uence …rm management. Moreover, if a bank holding equity is primarily interested in ensuring the service of its outstanding debt, this would con ‡ict with shareholders'interests (Brickley et al (1988), Almazan et al (1995)). …”

Section: Literature and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…log(Q) (Table 11) and also ROA (Table 12). In table 13 we perform an additional robustness check to alleviate the potential endogeneity problem by including the one-period lagged values of the explanatory variables. All results remain unaltered.…”

Section: Simultaneous Equationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bank Ownership, Firm Value and Firm Capital Structure in Europe

Baert

Vennet

2009

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may Rudi Vander VennetGhent University AbstractWe investigate whether or not banks play a positive role in the ownership structure of European listed …rms. We distinguish between banks and other institutional investors as shareholders and examine empirically the relationship beween …nancial institution ownership and the performance of the …rms in which they hold equity. Our main …nding is that after controlling for the capital structure decision of the …rms and the ownership decision of …nancial institutions in a simultaneous equations model, we …nd that there is a negative relationship between …nancial institution ownership and the market value of …rms, measured as the Tobin's Q. This is in contradiction with the monitoring hypothesis.

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Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments

Cited by 1,355 publications

References 34 publications

Institutional Investors, Corporate Ownership and Corporate Governance: Global Perspectives

Institutional Investors, Corporate Ownership and Corporate Governance: Global Perspectives

Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting

Bank Ownership, Firm Value and Firm Capital Structure in Europe

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