Ownership structure, investors’ protection and corporate valuation: the effect of judicial system efficiency in family and non-family firms

Lepore, Luigi; Paolone, Francesco; Cambrea, Domenico Rocco

doi:10.1007/s10997-018-9405-0

Cited by 29 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 90 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Furthermore, a wide sample could make it interesting to search for industry effects on the board diversity‐CSP association. Moreover, the study could be replicated to include a sample of European listed companies to investigate cross‐country differences among listed firms in the board diversity‐CSP association, including an external CG control variable such as the legal regime (Canavati, 2018), the efficiency of the judicial system (Lepore et al, 2018), the business environment in which firms operate (Cambrea et al, 2021; García‐Sánchez et al, 2021).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Board diversity and corporate social performance: Does the family firm status matter?

Veltri

Mazzotta

Rubino

2021

Corp Soc Responsibility Env

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The aim of the study is to investigate whether the board of directors (BoD) diversity affect corporate social performance (CSP), an alternative measure of corporate performance based on social outcomes. The article distinguishes between a structural diversity of boards (proxied by director independence), and a demographic diversity in boards (proxied by gender diversity) and our concept of CSP. The sample is constituted of the firms listed to the FTSE‐MIB index, which comprehends the most Italian capitalized listed firms. The analysis, covering a ten‐year period (2010–2019), provides evidence that independent directors positively affect CSP and that gender has no effect on CSP. We also tested the association between BoD and CSP separately for family firms (FFs) and non‐family firms (NFFs) to investigate whether FF status is a contingent condition modifying the effect of board features on CSP. Our result provide evidence of it.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Board diversity and corporate social performance: Does the family firm status matter?

Veltri

Mazzotta

Rubino

2021

Corp Soc Responsibility Env

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In markets with high ownership concentration and weak investors protection, firm management monitoring exerted by the controlling blockholders acts as a substitute for external corporate governance mechanisms (Lepore et al, 2017). Additionally, in such countries, agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders tend to increase because of excess power in hands of dominant shareholders who might look for private benefits of control (Lepore et al, 2018).…”

Section: Background and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The importance of corporate governance to investors has motivated numerous efforts by firms and regulatory institutions to shape corporate governance systems that guarantee investors rights. The institutional and legal system is important to the firm corporate governance system (Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009;Lepore et al, 2018;Anderson and Gupta, 2009), with strong shareholder protection leading to better corporate governance practices (Durnev and Kim, 2005). Although the institutional environment has an important effect on corporate governance, heterogeneity exists among firm practices within national boundaries as many firms choose to integrate corporate governance practices beyond those required by law (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The ultimate controlling owner and corporate governance in Brazil

Crisóstomo

Brandão

2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Purpose High ownership concentration makes controlling blockholders powerful enough to use private benefits of control and able to shape the corporate governance system to favor their own interests. This paper aims to examine the effect of the nature of the ultimate firm owner on the quality of corporate governance in Brazil. Design/methodology/approach Econometric models are estimated to assess whether the nature of the ultimate controlling shareholder affects the quality of the corporate governance system. Models are estimated using panel data methodology with coefficients estimated by the generalized method of moments system estimator. Findings The results show that the absence of a controlling shareholder has a positive effect on corporate governance, whereas the presence of a controlling blockholder, or a shareholder agreement among a few large shareholders, has a negative effect. This adverse effect holds when the controlling blockholder is a family or another firm. The findings are in line with the expropriation effect given that weaker corporate governance system facilitates controlling shareholders’ ability to extract private benefits of control. The findings also give support to the substitution effect as powerful blockholders take on the management monitoring function by weakening the board. Originality value Following important previous literature, the study investigates the effect of the nature of large controlling shareholders on the adoption of good corporate governance practices. The work provides additional evidence on the effect of the nature of large controlling shareholders on the quality of the corporate governance system in Brazil, taking into account the main kinds of controlling blockholders present in that market. The findings give support to both the expropriation and substitution hypotheses highlighting the presence of the principal-principal agency model in an important emerging market, Brazil.

show abstract

“…Economic growth and political stability are perceived to be directly proportional i.e., if political conditions are stable, then economic growth will boost and vice versa. For example, politically instable governments spend lavishly and indulge in certain social evils like grafting, expropriation, embezzlement of funds, nepotism, favoritism, political victimization and fraudulent activities to pay off illegal rewards/bonuses to their allies and generate illegitimate revenues to handle their opponents and ultimately, they impact economic policy (EP) negatively (Gulyamov, 2021;Lepore, Paolone, & Cambrea, 2018;Modugu & Dempere, 2020;Montes et al, 2019).…”

Section: Political Stability and Absence Of Violence/terrorismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nexus between Governance Indicators & Sustainable Stock Market Development in Pakistan: Evidences from Symmetric and Asymmetric Analysis

Islam

Bilal

2021

Pak. J. Humanit. Soc. Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The hidden non-linear association between governance indicators & stock market development (SMD) of Pakistan has been scrutinized in this study by using two comparative co-integrating techniques known as ARDL (Auto-regressive Distributed Lag) & NARDL (Non-linear ARDL). Empirical evidence suggests that misrepresented inferences arise by ignoring hidden non-linearity nexus between the variables. The ARDL results indicate that political stability & absence of violence/terrorism does not impact directly the SMD of Pakistan. Voice & accountability positively and significantly impact SMD, but rule of law does not impact SMD of Pakistan directly. The regulatory quality is highly significant and negatively impacts SMD. Contrarily, the NARDL frame indicates significant differences amid coefficients of components of governance index, denoting asymmetric links between variables. The Positive & Negative sums of partial decompositions of Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, Political Stability & Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PS&AVT), and Voice & Accountability (V&A) significantly impact SMD. The impact of partial Negative multipliers of Regulatory Quality, and PS&AVT has a highly significant and negative impact, while V&A has a significant and positive impact on SMD. The impact of Positive partial multipliers of all variables is positive and significant except V&A. The comparative diagnostics extricate precariousness in policy moratorium. This study will add credence to the predictive power of governance indicators towards SMD of Pakistan by incorporating Positive and Negative decomposed multipliers.

show abstract

Ownership structure, investors’ protection and corporate valuation: the effect of judicial system efficiency in family and non-family firms

Cited by 29 publications

References 90 publications

Board diversity and corporate social performance: Does the family firm status matter?

Board diversity and corporate social performance: Does the family firm status matter?

The ultimate controlling owner and corporate governance in Brazil

Nexus between Governance Indicators & Sustainable Stock Market Development in Pakistan: Evidences from Symmetric and Asymmetric Analysis

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About