Abstract-Wireless access networks are often characterized by the interaction of different end users, communication technologies, and network operators. This paper analyzes the dynamics among these "actors" by focusing on the processes of wireless network selection, where end users may choose among multiple available access networks to get connectivity, and resource allocation, where network operators may set their radio resources to provide connectivity. The interaction among end users is modeled as a noncooperative congestion game, where players (end users) selfishly select the access network that minimizes their perceived selection cost. A method based on mathematical programming is proposed to find Nash equilibria and characterize their optimality under three cost functions, which are representative of different technological scenarios. System level simulations are then used to evaluate the actual throughput and fairness of the equilibrium points. The interaction among end users and network operators is then assessed through a two-stage multileader/multifollower game, where network operators (leaders) play in the first stage by properly setting the radio resources to maximize their users, and end users (followers) play in the second stage the aforementioned network selection game. The existence of exact and approximated subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the two-stage game is thoroughly assessed and numerical results are provided on the "quality" of such equilibria.