2022
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2022.2111313
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Pandemic Decentralization: COVID-19 and Principal–Agent Relations in Russia

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Cited by 9 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…The proliferation of the so-called 'unfunded mandates' further strengthens the dependence of the regions on federal financial support. In a combination with strong authoritarian rule in the center, this provides the Kremlin with almost unlimited opportunities to shift the blame for unpopular measures and suboptimal policy outcomes, as well as the burden of fulfilling costly tasks to the regional administrations (Bednar 2009, p. 1-16;Busygina and Klimovich 2022).…”
Section: Federalism and Decentralizationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The proliferation of the so-called 'unfunded mandates' further strengthens the dependence of the regions on federal financial support. In a combination with strong authoritarian rule in the center, this provides the Kremlin with almost unlimited opportunities to shift the blame for unpopular measures and suboptimal policy outcomes, as well as the burden of fulfilling costly tasks to the regional administrations (Bednar 2009, p. 1-16;Busygina and Klimovich 2022).…”
Section: Federalism and Decentralizationmentioning
confidence: 99%