Since the revival of direct gubernatorial elections in 2012, regional governors in Russia have two formal principals: the president and the people of the region. The principal–agent theory defines this situation as a common agency problem. In the context of authoritarian federalism, direct elections pose a two-fold challenge to Vladimir Putin’s vertical power. First, even if manipulated, elections can lead to unpredictable outcomes for the federal center. Second, in the long run, popular legitimacy incentivizes regional leaders to become more independent from the Kremlin. This study argues that the federal center in Russia has addressed the common agency problem not only by limiting the freedom of choice for the local populations through restrictive electoral law, but also by adopting a recruitment pattern that prefers outsider governors who lack personal connection to the regions of service. An original dataset on regional governors’ selection in 2012–2018 provides empirical evidence for this claim.

This literature review unpacks the state of the art in Russian studies regarding regime dynamics and the functioning of authoritarian institutions. It covers three major fields of scientific debate in the discipline: 1) the role of structural and agency-driven factors in explaining failed democratization and complete autocratization in Russia; 2) the conceptualization of the Russian regime between electoral authoritarianism and personalist rule; 3) the development of authoritarian institutions under Vladimir Putin and the process of institutional degradation. It also outlines the promising research avenues of studying Russian authoritarianism, which can be relevant not only for the scientific community but also for the practitioners, especially in the context of the Russian war against Ukraine.

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