Paretian dictators: constraining choice in a voluntary contribution game

Oxoby, Robert J.

doi:10.1007/s10602-013-9139-6

Cited by 12 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…Bolle and Vogel (2011) examine a similar setting and report that both elected and randomly appointed allocators increase the levels of public goods provision over the benchmark of the standard linear public goods game, although the effect becomes smaller with repetition. In addition, Oxoby (2006) and Fleiß and Palan (2012) also find that contributions increase when a randomly selected delegate can choose contribution levels for all group members.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Providing Global Public Goods: Electoral Delegation and Cooperation

Kocher

Tan

2014

SSRN Journal

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This paper experimentally examines the effect of electoral delegation on providing global public goods shared by several groups. Each group elects a delegate who can freely decide on each group member's contribution (including the contribution of herself) to the global public good. Our results show that people mostly vote for delegates who assign equal contributions for every group member. However, in contrast to standard theoretical predictions, unequal contributions across groups drive cooperation down over time, and it decreases efficiency by almost 50% compared to the benchmark. This pattern is not driven by delegates trying to exploit their fellow group members, as indicated by the theory -quite to the opposite, other-regarding preferences and a re-election incentives guarantee that delegates assign equal contributions for all group members. Since the source of the resulting inefficiency is the polycentric nature of global public goods provision together with other-regarding preferences, we use the term Pinefficiency to describe our finding.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Providing Global Public Goods: Electoral Delegation and Cooperation

Kocher

Tan

2014

SSRN Journal

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“…Again, this has a positive effect on contribution levels. Oxoby (2013) confirms that individuals in a public goods experiment are willing to exchange liberty (i.e., unlimited choices) for efficiency. Contrary to these previous studies, in the present paper there is no clear trade-off between efficiency and individual liberty because we use a charitable giving experiment in which Pareto-improvements are not obvious.…”

mentioning

confidence: 56%

Doing good with other people's money: An experiment on people's (UN) willingness to grant others the freedom to choose

Carlsson

Kataria

Lampi

et al. 2017

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

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We augment a standard allocation experiment to investigate how preferences for an environmental project relate to the willingness to limit others' choices. We ask the allocator to choose his own donation level, a donation level for him and his group, and the minimum donation level for the group members (excluding the allocator). We find that donations dictated to the whole group are, on average, lower than individual donations and that this decrease is consistent with the expectations of what others would like to donate. Moreover, most allocators force the others to donate a positive, though low, amount. Thus, unlimited freedom of choice is rejected by the majority of the subjects.

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“…4 Reference [13] also removes strategic interaction from a one-shot VCM allowing participants to mandate the contributions of the opponents or to restrict their choices to a subset of levels. These conditions resulted in a sizeable increase in contributions.…”

Section: Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In other words, subjects may contribute because the group gains 1.5 € for every euro of private contribution. 13 Note; however, that positive contributions in the Patron Game increase the payoff of the other group members at the expenses of the patron, whose earnings decrease by construction. In other words, efficiency considerations do not allow the players to reach a Pareto superior outcome.…”

Section: Efficiency Concernsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Patron Game: the Individual Provision of a Public Good

Filippin

Raimondi

2018

Games

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Abstract:The Patron Game studies the individual provision of a public good, i.e., a situation in which the cost of contributing exceeds by construction its private return (e.g., volunteering, Open Collaboration projects). We test the Patron Game in the lab finding that contributions are high, though significantly lower than in a classic Public Good Game. Results show that demand effects and the warm glow of giving account almost entirely for the contributions, with the former playing the most prominent role. The social nature of the individual provision of a public good is confirmed by the fact that, even when the efficiency multiplier is removed, contributions are higher than in comparable Dictator Games.

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Paretian dictators: constraining choice in a voluntary contribution game

Cited by 12 publications

References 55 publications

Providing Global Public Goods: Electoral Delegation and Cooperation

Providing Global Public Goods: Electoral Delegation and Cooperation

Doing good with other people's money: An experiment on people's (UN) willingness to grant others the freedom to choose

The Patron Game: the Individual Provision of a Public Good

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