Parliamentary Opposition in Post-Communist Democracies: Power of the Powerless

Abstract

This article charts the development of parliamentary opposition in post-communist Eastern Europe in the context of the changing nature of executive -legislative relations. We first review the existing literature on opposition in post-communist Europe. The second part of the article presents an analytical framework of different modes of executive -legislative interactions. Empirical analysis then demonstrates the practical relevance of these modes in post-communist political systems and their consequences for the position of the parliamentary opposition. We draw our empirical material from three countries of the region: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary. We demonstrate that political parties have become the principal source of parliamentary opposition in these countries. However, we also highlight the crucial link between party stability and the ability of the opposition to influence the policy-making process.

Performing to Type? How State Institutions Matter in East Central Europe

“…As for parliaments, analysts have looked at two main institutional features: (i) executive-legislative relations, and (ii) internal structures and procedures. Research on the former has in the main sought to determine the extent to which governments have come to dominate the parliamentary arena in ECE (Kopecky 2004; Olson and Norton 2007; Millard 2008; Pettai and Madise 2006; Carey et al 2002; Kopecky and Spirova 2008; Goetz and Zubek 2007; Zubek 2006; 2008b; Mansfeldova et al 2005; Schiemann 2004; van der Meer Krok-Paszkowska 2000). Initially, there was an emphasis on ‘overparliamentarisation’ of ECE polities, which was seen to be promoted by the inexperience of executives, low party loyalty of MPs, high political polarization and extensive formal prerogatives that the new parliaments had inherited from the Communist past (Ágh 1994; Olson and Norton 1996; Carey et al 2002).…”

Domestic scrutiny ofEuropean Union politics: Between whistle blowing and opposition control

“…We discuss this assumption with respect to our cases in the empirical section. Moreover, German and Czech parties reveal a high level of discipline that is characteristic of parliamentary democracies (Hix & Noury ; Kopecký & Spirova ). In a similar vein, parties are extremely influential for the building and survival of governing coalitions (Strøm et al.…”

“…The provisions for parliamentary scrutiny grant individual political groups the power to refer documents to the committees. In both countries, parliamentary party groups can be considered the main actors (Holzhacker ; Kopecký & Spirova ; Linek & Mansfeldová ). The German grand coalition is oversized and stable between two integration‐friendly parties in the largest and oldest EU Member State.…”

Policy-making power of opposition players: a comparative institutional perspective

“…Beyond the research on different types of opposition and the different features to distinguish among them, most of the existing studies on parliamentary oppositions focus on relatively few cases (see, eg Andeweg et al, 2008 ; Church & Vatter, 2009 ; Christiansen & Damgaard, 2008 ; Gel’man, 2005 ; Helms, 2004 ; Inoguchi, 2008 ; Kaiser, 2008 ; Kopecky & Spirova, 2008 ; Mujica & Sanchez-Cuenca, 2006 ; Schrire, 2008 ) or do not look at political regimes beyond one specific type of democracy. Studies focus either on parliamentary democracies (see, eg Garritzmann, 2017 ; Schnapp & Harfst, 2005 ; Sieberer, 2011 ) or on presidential ones (see, eg Morgenstern et al, 2008 ).…”