Parliamentary Voting Procedures in Comparison

Hug, Simon; Wegmann, Simone; Wüest, Reto

doi:10.1080/01402382.2015.1045290

Cited by 12 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…Second, they add to, and extend, a growing literature highlighting an ‘electoral connection’ in legislative organisation (Hug et al. ; Keh ; Taylor ). In particular, these findings accord with the idea that under some circumstances party leaders might actually find decentralisation to be in their interests (Proksch & Slapin , ).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 57%

“…Second, they add to a growing body of literature suggesting an ‘electoral connection’ in legislative organisation, whereby the internal rules of parliaments are shaped by the strategies by which their members pursue re‐election (Hug et al. ; Keh ; Proksch & Slapin , ; Taylor ). They also extend this literature by tracing these strategies to influences beyond formal electoral institutions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

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Partisan dealignment and committee power in five Westminster parliaments

Fleming

2018

European J Political Res

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What explains the power of parliamentary committees? A large literature on the United States Congress sees strong legislative committees as a consequence of legislators’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote. These incentives are typically understood to be determined by formal electoral rules. How legislatures are elected thus shapes how they are organised. This article argues that explanations of legislative organisation should also consider a non‐institutional source of personal vote‐seeking incentives: voters’ partisanship. Where partisan dealignment is more extensive, legislators have stronger incentives to develop a personal vote. Where committee systems are more powerful, legislators have better opportunities to do so. Partisan dealignment should thus lead to stronger committee systems. This argument is supported by analysis of original data on the postwar evolution of committee systems in five ‘Westminster’ parliaments. Partisan dealignment is associated with larger committee systems, and with larger expansions of committee systems.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 57%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Partisan dealignment and committee power in five Westminster parliaments

Fleming

2018

European J Political Res

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“…Strategic behavior is an important component for MPs, as several studies have illustrated the importance of strategic voting in parliaments (Farquharson, 1969;Clinton & Meirowitz, 2004;Rasch, 2014;Bütikofer & Hug, 2015;Hug et al, 2015). Moreover, MPs also express their strategic nature by the use of parliamentary requests (Bowler, 2010;Martin, 2011b;Kellermann, 2013Kellermann, , 2015Martin & Rozenberg, 2014).…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Parliamentarians’ strategies for policy evaluations

Bundi

2018

Evaluation and Program Planning

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This article considers the question of which strategies parliamentarians pursue when they use parliamentary requests demanding an evaluation. In order to be re-elected or to achieve desirable policies, parliamentarians can either appeal to their constituency or to their party by adopting legislative roles. The study is based on twelve case studies of parliamentary requests from the Swiss parliament between 2010 and 2014. The analysis shows that parliamentarians of legislative committees submit parliamentary requests to oppose a policy, while parliamentarians of oversight committees submit parliamentary requests to obtain information on specific policies. On the contrary, the party membership of the responsible Federal Councillor does not influence the strategy. These findings suggest that parliamentarians use evaluations as an instrument rather than using the actual findings. This conclusion might be very relevant to understand how evaluations are used in the political process.

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“…While not all votes are recorded in the House of Commons, with voice voting being the default voting procedure (Hug et al 2015), this is less of a worry here than if analysing floor voting behaviour. While MPs may not always enjoy being present for votes, any bias resulting from a non-random sample of votes being recorded should be constant across MPs regardless of the remoteness of their constituency.…”

Section: Case Data and Operationalisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

So far away from me? The effect of geographical distance on representation

Willumsen

2018

West European Politics

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Legislators face numerous trade-offs with regard to how to spend their time. One factor is, however, beyond their control: the distance between their constituency and the legislature. A more distant constituency implies increased travel, which decreases the time available for activities within the legislature itself, while also raising the possibility of centre-periphery dynamics in representation. Previous work has found that as distance between constituency and legislature increases, so does constituency focus, but it has not established why this is. This article explores the impact of geographical remoteness on representational activity, analysing a dataset of parliamentary activity in the British House of Commons (2005-2015), showing that the more remote an MP's constituency, the less likely that MP is to attend votes, while being more likely to sign Early Day Motions. The article further shows that this is most likely driven by a centreperiphery dynamic rather than simply being a response to longer travel time. KEYWORDS Representation; UK House of Commons; centre-periphery; vote attendance; Early Day Motions; distance to capital Representation, that is, an effective link between voters and legislators, is key to the satisfactory functioning of modern democracy (Powell 2004). Representative democracy also has a normative requirement that all voters be represented equally, and systematic differences in representation avoided. Analysing systematic differences in the quality of representation is a central question, which has been explored, inter alia, with regard to interest groups (see, for example, Klüver 2012), voter wealth and income (Bartels 2016; Gilens and Page 2014), gender (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005), race (Butler and Broockman 2011), and educational levels (Persson 2013). The role geography plays in representation, however, remains relatively unexplored.

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Parliamentary Voting Procedures in Comparison

Cited by 12 publications

References 49 publications

Partisan dealignment and committee power in five Westminster parliaments

Partisan dealignment and committee power in five Westminster parliaments

Parliamentarians’ strategies for policy evaluations

So far away from me? The effect of geographical distance on representation

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