Partial exposure in large games

Gradwohl, Ronen; Reingold, Omer

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.006

Cited by 21 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Other related mechanism-design issues have been studied. One issue is limiting "exposure," where agents internalize being exposed to the realized types and chosen actions of a subset of other agents (Gradwohl and Reingold 2010) or to the party responsible for implementing the mechanism (Gradwohl 2015). Another issue is "anonymity," where agents may seek to participate in a mechanism multiple times when anonymizing is too easy (Wagman and Conitzer 2014).…”

Section: Data Intermediariesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Economics of Privacy

Acquisti

Taylor²,

Wagman³

2016

Journal of Economic Literature

900

406

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Section: Data Intermediariesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Economics of Privacy

Acquisti

Taylor²,

Wagman³

2016

Journal of Economic Literature

900

406

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…In a previous work [12] we attempt to generalize the work of Kalai, and introduce the notion of partial exposure. We show that in any large game, players' Nash strategies remain nearly optimal even after they are exposed to the chosen actions of some of the other players.…”

Section: Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fault tolerance in large games

Gradwohl

Reingold

2008

Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

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A Nash equilibrium is an optimal strategy for each player under the assumption that others play according to their respective Nash strategies. In the presence of irrational players or coalitions of colluding players, however, it provides no guarantees. Some recent literature has focused on measuring the potential damage caused by the presence of faulty behavior, as well as designing mechanisms that are resilient against such faults. In this paper we show that large games are naturally fault tolerant. We first quantify the ways in which two subclasses of large games -λ-continuous games and anonymous games -are resilient against Byzantine faults (i.e. irrational behavior), coalitions, and asynchronous play. We then show that general large games also have some non-trivial resilience against faults.

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“…In particular, we expect that it is possible to dispense with semi-anonymity using the techniques of Deb and Kalai (2010) and Azrieli and Shmaya (2011), and to dispense with the assumption that players' types are independent using the approach of Gradwohl and Reingold (2010). We leave these issues for further research.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%