2019
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijepes.2019.03.039
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Partial grid false data injection attacks against state estimation

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Cited by 44 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…The simulation results demonstrated that by correctly estimating one state of the system, the FDI attack could be performed without being detected by BDD methods. In [40], the impact of FDI attacks on estimated states of power grids was investigated assuming attackers have partial knowledge of the system information. Then, the partial grid FDI attack was applied to demonstrate how FDI attacks could be undetectable.…”
Section: State Estimation Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The simulation results demonstrated that by correctly estimating one state of the system, the FDI attack could be performed without being detected by BDD methods. In [40], the impact of FDI attacks on estimated states of power grids was investigated assuming attackers have partial knowledge of the system information. Then, the partial grid FDI attack was applied to demonstrate how FDI attacks could be undetectable.…”
Section: State Estimation Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Liu and He utilized the most commonly used weighted last square (WLS) approach [12]. Furthermore, advanced information technology offers additional opportunities [13], as well as innovative architectures [14,15]. The current level of observability (lack of measurement devices and expert systems) makes effective fault localization difficult.…”
Section: Literature Review Of Dsse Use-casesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…S A } is synchronously constructed, where the attacked bus is randomly selected in {bus 2, bus 3, bus 9} and the corresponding attack intensity is randomly selected from {10%, 20%, 30%}. The rationale behind such settings mainly includes the following two points: 1) The number of tampered variables should be limited due to the presence of attack cost [29]. 2) 30% is taken as the upper bound of the attack intensity since the normal distribution of the measurements is well known by the operators/defenders in the control center, indicating an attack vector with an overly large attack intensity is fairly doubtful.…”
Section: A Data Generationmentioning
confidence: 99%