Partially random phase attack to the practical two-way quantum-key-distribution system

Sun, Shi-Hai; Gao, Ming; Jiang, Mu-Sheng; Li, Chunyan; Liang, Lin-Mei

doi:10.1103/physreva.85.032304

Cited by 49 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Furthermore, for a coherent state |α , the probability distribution of the measured result of homodyne detection can be written as [9]…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Quantum key distribution (QKD) 1 admits two remote parties (Alice and Bob) to share unconditional secure key based on the principle of quantum mechanics 2 3 , which has been demonstrated in experiments with long distance and high repetition rate 4 5 6 7 . However, the practical QKD system will suffer from quantum hacking due to device imperfections 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 , then the unconditional security of QKD is compromised. In practical QKD systems based on BB84 protocol, the weak coherent source (WCS) is often used to replace the single photon source which is unavailable within current technology.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Ref. 9 , our group proposed an attack to show that the QKD system is still insecure even if the phase of source is partially randomized, but it is invalid for the widely used weak + vacuum decoy state method (their attack is only valid for the special one-decoy state method in some parameter regimes).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Hacking on decoy-state quantum key distribution system with partial phase randomization

Sun

Jiang

et al. 2014

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Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides means for unconditional secure key transmission between two distant parties. However, in practical implementations, it suffers from quantum hacking due to device imperfections. Here we propose a hybrid measurement attack, with only linear optics, homodyne detection, and single photon detection, to the widely used vacuum + weak decoy state QKD system when the phase of source is partially randomized. Our analysis shows that, in some parameter regimes, the proposed attack would result in an entanglement breaking channel but still be able to trick the legitimate users to believe they have transmitted secure keys. That is, the eavesdropper is able to steal all the key information without discovered by the users. Thus, our proposal reveals that partial phase randomization is not sufficient to guarantee the security of phase-encoding QKD systems with weak coherent states.

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“…Furthermore, for a coherent state |α , the probability distribution of the measured result of homodyne detection can be written as [9]…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hacking on decoy-state quantum key distribution system with partial phase randomization

Sun

Jiang

et al. 2014

Sci Rep

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“…It has been shown that when the phase is not randomized, the performance will be substantially reduced with a strict security proof [20]. In fact, there are experimental quantum hacking demonstrations showing that a QKD system may be attacked when the phase is not randomized [21,22].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Discrete-phase-randomized coherent state source and its application in quantum key distribution

et al. 2015

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Coherent state photon sources are widely used in quantum information processing. In many applications, such as quantum key distribution (QKD), a coherent state functions as a mixture of Fock states by assuming that its phase is continuously randomized. In practice, such a crucial assumption is often not satisfied, and therefore the security of existing QKD experiments is not guaranteed. To bridge this gap, we provide a rigorous security proof of QKD with discrete-phase-randomized coherent state sources. Our results show that the performance of the discrete-phase randomization case is close to its continuous counterpart with only a small number (say, 10) of discrete phases. Compared to the conventional continuous phase randomization case, where an infinite amount of random bits are required, our result shows that only a small amount (say, 4 bits) of randomness is needed.

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“…Finally, a type of light injection attack that affects the operation of the laser diode in the transmitter has recently been introduced, allowing Eve to actively derandomise the source's phase and even change other parameters [54]. Indeed, the use of non-phase-randomised signals has a severe effect on the security of QKD, as has been shown in the past decade [55][56][57][58].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Laser-seeding Attack in Quantum Key Distribution

et al. 2019

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Quantum key distribution (QKD) based on the laws of quantum physics allows the secure distribution of secret keys over an insecure channel. Unfortunately, imperfect implementations of QKD compromise its information-theoretical security. Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is a promising approach to remove all side channels from the measurement unit, which is regarded as the "Achilles' heel" of QKD. An essential assumption in MDI-QKD is however that the sources are trusted. Here we experimentally demonstrate that a practical source based on a semiconductor laser diode is vulnerable to a laser seeding attack, in which light injected from the communication line into the laser results in an increase of the intensities of the prepared states. The unnoticed increase of intensity may compromise the security of QKD, as we show theoretically for the prepare-and-measure decoy-state BB84 and MDI-QKD protocols. Our theoretical security analysis is general and can be applied to any vulnerability that increases the intensity of the emitted pulses. Moreover, a laser seeding attack might be launched as well against decoy-state based quantum cryptographic protocols beyond QKD.

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Partially random phase attack to the practical two-way quantum-key-distribution system

Cited by 49 publications

References 36 publications

Hacking on decoy-state quantum key distribution system with partial phase randomization

Hacking on decoy-state quantum key distribution system with partial phase randomization

Discrete-phase-randomized coherent state source and its application in quantum key distribution

Laser-seeding Attack in Quantum Key Distribution

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