Participación, éxito y prioridad. Un análisis macro de los equilibrios en las relaciones entre los poderes ejecutivo y legislativo en Colombia, 2002–2006

Abstract

En el artículo se evaluarán las principales características del vínculo entre ejecutivo y legislativo, durante el primer gobierno de Álvaro Uribe Vélez, que han producido innumerables apreciaciones, altamente imprecisas y cuestionables, con respecto a la configuración del denominado centralismo presidencial limitado. Para ello se revisarán dos variables clásicas en este tipo de estudios: los poderes constitucionales y los poderes partidarios del presidente, con el fin de analizar la influencia de estos poderes sobre el volumen de producción legislativa de cada rama del poder, así como su eficacia y eficiencia como promotores de legislación.

Using Evidence in a Highly Fragmented Legislature: The Case of Colombia’s Health System Reform

“…Finally, one of the most prominent elements of Colombia's legislature is the "personalist" nature of political candidacies (Pachón and Hoskin 2011), in which political parties serve mainly as conduits for prominent individuals, in a system favouring 'client' relations over partisan identities (Saiegh 2010;Milanese 2011;Pachón and Johnson 2016; also confirmed in interviews). Often, this involves prioritizing what Pachón and Johnson (2016) have called "distributive pork-barrel projects": obtaining resources to benefit the constituency that gets them elected (see also Milanese 2011).…”

“…Under the current Constitution, the two-party system that had dominated politics prior to the 1990s was replaced by a highly fragmented, multi-party system, with later reforms, in 2003, aimed at reducing this fragmentation. The present system is characterised not only by weak party structures (with parties serving as electoral vehicles for candidates to promote their own personal agendas), but by high electoral volatility, whereby new parties frequently emerge but often cease to exist in one or two elections cycles (Botero et al 2011;Milanese 2011;Pachón and Johnson 2016).…”

Evidence Use in Health Policy Making

“…Finally, one of the most prominent elements of Colombia's legislature is the "personalist" nature of political candidacies (Pachón and Hoskin 2011), in which political parties serve mainly as conduits for prominent individuals, in a system favouring 'client' relations over partisan identities (Saiegh 2010;Milanese 2011;; also confirmed in interviews). Often, this involves prioritizing what have called "distributive pork-barrel projects": obtaining resources to benefit the constituency that gets them elected (see also Milanese 2011).…”

“…Under the current Constitution, the two-party system that had dominated politics prior to the 1990s was replaced by a highly fragmented, multi-party system, with later reforms, in 2003, aimed at reducing this fragmentation. The present system is characterised not only by weak party structures (with parties serving as electoral vehicles for candidates to promote their own personal agendas), but by high electoral volatility, whereby new parties frequently emerge but often cease to exist in one or two elections cycles (Botero et al 2011;Milanese 2011;.…”

Corte al Congreso: Poder judicial y trámite legislativo en Colombia

“…Los estudios sobre Congreso y producción de políticas públicas en Colombia se han enfocado mayoritariamente en la relación entre el Ejecutivo y el Legislativo (Milanese 2011;Carroll y Pachón 2016). Los trabajos que analizan la influencia de la rama judicial sobre el Congreso se han centrado en la influencia directa de la Corte Constitucional (CC) sobre el legislativo (Cárdenas, Junguito y Pachón 2008).…”