Parties and Change in the Post-Bailout Cyprus: The May 2016 Parliamentary Elections

Triga, Vasiliki

doi:10.1080/13608746.2017.1312768

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…While there may be reasons to suspect that public trust has increased within the Greek Cypriot community, the same cannot be said of political trust. Most notably, the 2012-2013 economic crisis appears to have engendered suspicion of political elites as a whole and contributed to voter disillusionment (Triga 2017). According to the 2013 Eurobarometer survey, for instance, 91 percent of Cypriots responded that they did not trust their political parties (Eurobarometer 2013).…”

Section: Recognition and Trust Within The Greek Cypriot Communitymentioning

confidence: 99%

4 The shifting sands of relational peace in Cyprus

Klocek¹

2023

Relational Peace Practices

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On March 31, 2004, Kofi Annan made an impassioned plea for local Cypriot leaders to support impending referenda to end three decades of division on the island. He framed the importance of these plebiscites in no uncertain terms: "Let me be clear. The choice is not between this settlement plan and some other magical or mythical solution. In reality, at this stage, the choice is between this settlement and no settlement" (Annan 2004). The Secretary-General's words proved to be hauntingly accurate. While a majority of the Turkish Cypriot population voted in favor of a federation of two states, more than three-quarters of Greek Cypriots cast their ballots in opposition. And in the decade and a half since the failed 2004 reunification plan, no fewer than four additional rounds of peace talks have been attempted and abandoned. 1 Today, the divided island remains the site of Europe's longest unresolved political dispute and an archetype of intractable conflict (Heraclides 2011). 2 The half-century of political stalemate in Cyprus raises challenging questions for peace scholars and practitioners alike. 3 Why has it been so difficult to reunify the island? Why have top-down negotiations such as the Annan Plan, as well as more recent bottom-up approaches, proved equally ineffective? What might a permanent settlement even look like at this point?There is, of course, no shortage of answers to such questions. Politicians, policy analysts, peacemakers, and conflict scholars have all weighed in over the years. This diverse set of actors has advanced varied and inventive plans of action, but most share a common perspective. Taking a negative peace framework as their starting point, they stress that the island has been free of extended periods of armed conflict since the 1974 ceasefire that divided Cyprus and express a strong desire not to undermine the current status quo. Policy suggestions, in turn, involve some variation of security guarantees and a plan for shared governance between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The primary concern of these plans is to avoid a return to intercommunal violence. They overwhelmingly frame the Greek and Turkish

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Section: Recognition and Trust Within The Greek Cypriot Communitymentioning

confidence: 99%

4 The shifting sands of relational peace in Cyprus

Klocek¹

2023

Relational Peace Practices

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“…In February 2013, Cyprus was confronted with what some have termed ‘its biggest financial shock’ (Triga, 2017: 263). In order to respond to the impact of the global financial crisis, Cyprus ‘was offered a rescue package in which a bail-in clause targeting all depositors was introduced to cover the needs of the banks’ (Charalambous et al, 2015: 405).…”

Section: Cyprus’ Historical and Political Background: Between Populis...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The bailout resulted in a 5.9% decline in national gross domestic product (GDP), paving the way for unemployment to hit a historic high of 16.9% (Iordanidou and Samaras, 2014; Triga, 2017). Economic reports show that the economic crisis in Cyprus had dramatic social consequences.…”

Section: Cyprus’ Historical and Political Background: Between Populis...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The economic crisis coincided with a crisis of political representation. As Triga (2017) notes, ‘growing political apathy, voter disillusionment, the great party fragmentation and the emergence of non-mainstream parties’ followed the crisis. In 2013, 91% of Cypriots participating in the Eurobarometer surveys stated that they ‘do not trust political parties’, giving Cyprus the second highest score in Europe (Eurobarometer, 2013: 12).…”

Section: Cyprus’ Historical and Political Background: Between Populis...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Its popularity damaged, AKEL lost the 2013 elections to DISY (Charalambous, 2014; Charalambous and Ioannou, 2015; Katsourides, 2016). Under immense pressure, the newly elected Anastasiades, along with the Cypriot parliament, were forced to capitulate to the Eurogroup’s demands, leading the country into its own era of memoranda (Triga, 2017).…”

Section: Cyprus’ Historical and Political Background: Between Populis...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Populism or Nationalism? The ‘Paradoxical’ Non-Emergence of Populism in Cyprus

Venizelos

2021

Political Studies

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This article investigates the curious non-emergence of populism in contemporary Cyprus despite the deep financial crisis and profound political disillusionment – conditions that are treated as necessary and sufficient. Putting emphasis on Cyprus’ key historical particularities, the article inquires into the ways Cyprus’ political past, and the subsequent salient ‘national question’, produce ambiguous notions of ‘the people’ on the one hand, and impede the potentials for a ‘populist moment’ on the other hand. By assessing the performative dynamics of oppositional parties in Cyprus, the empirical analysis suggests that the absence of populism is rooted in the following factors: First, nationalist discourse prevails over, and significantly weakens, populist discourse. Second, self-proclaimed challenger parties served ‘old wine in new bottles’ further undermining their position and claims. The failure of populism to take root in Cyprus, brings to the fore important theoretical insights relevant to the non-emergence of populism even under favourable conditions.

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