Partisan pandemic: How partisanship and public health concerns affect individuals’ social mobility during COVID-19

Clinton, Joshua D.; Cohen, Jon; Lapinski, John S.; Trussler, Marc

doi:10.1126/sciadv.abd7204

Cited by 203 publications

(176 citation statements)

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“…Specifically, independents and Democrats know 7.5 and 10.2% more about COVID-19 than Republicans, respectively. This is consistent with the divide observed at the elite level where Democrats have championed the adoption health guidelines to combat the pandemic while Republicans have downplayed them (Clinton et al, 2020;Green et al, 2020;Gadarian et al, 2021). In Brazil, where President Jair Bolsonaro has systematically minimized the seriousness of the virus and its illness (Barberia and Gómez, 2020;Ortega and Orsini, 2020), Calvo and Ventura (2021) show that Bolsonaro voters are more optimistic about the health risks and job insecurity associated with the COVID-19 pandemic when compared to those who voted for Fernando Haddad (PT) in the second round of the 2018 presidential election.…”

Section: Learning About Covid-19supporting

confidence: 87%

“…In both countries, political elites, including their respective presidents Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro, minimized the seriousness of the coronavirus and its illness since its outbreak and failed to be informative agents to curb the spread of the virus (Barberia and Gómez, 2020;Ortega and Orsini, 2020;Rutledge, 2020;Yamey and Gonsalves, 2020;Calvo and Ventura, 2021) 1 . This has resulted in lower compliance with health recommendations along partisan lines (Clinton et al, 2020) and many lives lost 2 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Political Preferences, Knowledge, and Misinformation About COVID-19: The Case of Brazil

et al. 2021

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The COVID-19 pandemic has led to a vast research agenda focusing on how citizens acquire knowledge about the virus and the health expert guidelines to protect themselves and their close ones against it. While many countries and regions have been accounted for, there still remains a substantial gap with respect to public opinion about the virus in Latin America, most notably in Brazil, which currently has the second highest in number of fatalities in the world. In this article, we employ a national survey of Brazilians (n = 2,771) to measure and explain knowledge and misinformation about the coronavirus and its illness, COVID-19. Our focus concerns the role of political preferences in a context of high elite polarization with a sitting government that has systematically downplayed the risks associated with the coronavirus and its illness. Our findings are clear: political preferences play a substantial role in explaining differences in knowledge about the coronavirus and COVID-19, more than conventional determinants of learning like motivation, ability, and opportunities. Specifically, we find that supporters of President Jair Bolsonaro—an avid science and COVID-19 denier—know significantly less about the coronavirus and its illness and are more likely to believe in a conspiracy theory that claims that the coronavirus was purposefully created in a Chinese laboratory to promote China's economic power, when compared to Brazilians who are less supportive of him and his government. Our findings carry important implications for how Brazilians take informational cues from political elites in that—even in a major event like a global pandemic—supporters of the president are as likely as ever to “follow their leader” and deny expert-backed scientific evidence.

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Section: Learning About Covid-19supporting

confidence: 87%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Preferences, Knowledge, and Misinformation About COVID-19: The Case of Brazil

et al. 2021

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“…As well, political self-identification can be a poor measure or political ideology, and that values-based questionnaires more accurately index political identity (Greene, 1999;Bankert et al, 2017;Huddy and Bankert, 2017). Nevertheless, the strong effects of selfidentified political identity observed here join a growing body of literature regarding partisan effects on pandemic related attitudes and beliefs (Conway et al, 2020;Jørgensen et al, 2020) and the complications this poses for its management (Clinton et al, 2021;Gollwitzer et al, 2020;Green et al, 2020). This suggests the value of further research and consideration of both normative value differences and partisan polarization in crafting effective management of future pandemics.…”

Section: Conclusion Limitations and Future Directionsmentioning

confidence: 73%

“…Political polarization can obscure these tradeoffs by focusing partisans on the values most important to their own side, while minimizing the importance of "out-group" values or even delegitimizing them. Bridging this divide-such that the effects of partisanship are minimized and all parties negotiate in good faith-is a difficult problem in its own respect, and much research effort has been conducted to identify its underpinnings, complications, and possible solutions (Clinton et al, 2021;Green et al, 2020;Rosenbaum, 2020), should any exist.…”

Section: Political Identity Normative Values and Preferences In Panmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Identity Over Personal Impact: Early U.S. Reactions to the COVID-19 Pandemic

2021

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Research suggests political identity has strong influence over individuals’ attitudes and beliefs, which in turn can affect their behavior. Likewise, firsthand experience with an issue can also affect attitudes and beliefs. A large (N = 6,383) survey (Pew Research and Ipsos W64) of Americans was analyzed to investigate the effects of both political identity (i.e., Democrat or Republican) and personal impact (i.e., whether they suffered job or income loss) on individuals’ reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic. Results show that political identity and personal impact influenced the American public’s attitudes about and response to COVID-19. Consistent with prior research, political identity exerted a strong influence on self-reports of emotional distress, threat perception, discomfort with exposure, support for restrictions, and perception of under/overreaction by individuals and institutions. The difference between Democrats and Republican responses were consistent with their normative value differences and with the contemporary partisan messaging. Personal impact exerted a comparatively weaker influence on reported emotional distress and threat perception. Both factors had a weak influence on appraisal of individual and government responses. The dominating influence of political identity carried over into the bivariate relations among these self-reported attitudes and responses. In particular, the appraisal of government response divided along party lines, tied to opposing views of whether there has been over- or under-reaction to the pandemic. The dominance of political identity has important implications for crisis management and reflects the influence of normative value differences between the parties, partisan messaging on the pandemic, and polarization in American politics.

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“…13 Additionally, teachers unions, which have more power in blue states where mask-wearing and social distancing are more prevalent (Allcott et al, 2020;Katz et al, 2020), have opposed what they see as "reckless re-openings" and threatened strikes in response to planned re-openings (Cassella et al, 2020). physical distancing amidst the pandemic, and that political ideology matters more for the use of COVID mitigation strategies than other factors such as COVID rates and demographic characteristics (Adolph et al, 2020;Brenan, 2020;Clinton et al, 2020;Gollwitzer et al, 2020;Grossman et al, 2020;Schneider, 2020;Van Kessel & Quinn, 2020). Yet these same communities, on average, have higher rates of COVID-19 infection and death (Jones & Kiley, 2020).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

To What Extent Does In-Person Schooling Contribute to the Spread of COVID-19? Evidence from Michigan and Washington

Goldhaber¹,

Imberman²,

Strunk³

et al. 2021

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for providing valuable feedback on this work at various points along the way. Any errors are our own. In addition, all opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of our institutions or funders, nor do they necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

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Partisan pandemic: How partisanship and public health concerns affect individuals’ social mobility during COVID-19

Cited by 203 publications

References 27 publications

Political Preferences, Knowledge, and Misinformation About COVID-19: The Case of Brazil

Political Preferences, Knowledge, and Misinformation About COVID-19: The Case of Brazil

Political Identity Over Personal Impact: Early U.S. Reactions to the COVID-19 Pandemic

To What Extent Does In-Person Schooling Contribute to the Spread of COVID-19? Evidence from Michigan and Washington

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