“…This is highly relevant for game theoretic models that have been, and are being, developed based on this assumption (Besley & Coate, 1997;Bol et al, 2019;Greenberg & Shepsle, 1987;Kselman & Tucker, 2011;Osborne, 2000;Osborne & Slivinski, 1996;Palfrey, 1984), for agent-based modellers who build their models based on this assumption (Laver & Sergenti, 2011) and for the literature on new party entry that predominantly focusses on how structural and institutional features of a polity shape affect entry (e.g., Harmel & Robertson, 1985;Hug, 2001;Tavits, 2006). Recently, this literature has also begun to consider more dynamic elements like voter discontent (Sikk, 2012;Tavits, 2006), party collapse (Laroze, 2019), voter turnout (Lago & Martínez, 2011), slack in the issue agenda (Lowery et al, 2013), or the effective number of parties (Kselman et al, 2016). Nonetheless, how short-term electoral market dynamics affect entry has remained underexposed.…”