Abstract:How do mixed‐member legislative systems influence legislator voting? While the literature remains inconclusive, this article suggests party influence as an intervening variable. Through an analysis of roll‐call data from Taiwan and Korea, no deviation is evident between district legislators and legislators elected by proportional representation. Further disaggregation of what it means to vote against one's party again finds little evidence of a tier distinction, while party variables remain significant. The fi… Show more
“…Thus, for instance, various scholars could not detect differing voting behaviors across parliamentarians who are elected under the PR tier and those elected under the SMD tiers in countries that use mixed‐member electoral systems (Crisp ; Jun and Hix ; Rich ), while others find only modest support for electoral systems' effect in a cross‐national analysis (Depauw and Martin ; Sieberer ).…”
Section: The Separate and Conditional Effect Of Electoral Systems Andmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Based on Carey and Shugart's () research, I hypothesize: H1 (Separate Effect of Electoral Systems) : The more permissive an electoral system is (ballot type, pool, and vote encouraging personal vote‐seeking incentives), the less unified parties' voting record will be (and vice versa).The vast empirical research that tried to test the expectations that stemmed from Carey and Shugart's article that parties under personal vote‐seeking electoral systems should exhibit lower levels of unity compared to parties in party‐centered systems yield inconclusive and indecisive results. Scholars used a case‐study prism to study the effect of electoral systems on legislators' and parties' behavior (Desposato ; Samuels ), while some took advantage of the unique quasi‐experimental design of mixed‐member electoral systems (Crisp ; Haspel, Remingron, and Smith ; Herron ; Jun and Hix ; Kunicova and Remington ; Rich ; Sieberer ). Still others utilize a cross‐country framework (Carey ; Depauw and Martin ; Sieberer ).…”
Section: The Separate and Conditional Effect Of Electoral Systems Andmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The empirical inconclusiveness might be explained by the effect of party nomination. Party nomination may refer to nomination to “mega seats” (Kam ; Martin ), nomination to legislators' postparliamentary careers (Carey ; Hix ; Jun and Hix ), and nomination within the legislative electoral game, that is, candidate selection procedures (Jun and Hix ; Preece ; Rich ). Literature on the first two types of party nominations emphasized that they interact with the electoral rules in explaining voting behavior (e.g., Jun and Hix ).…”
Section: The Separate and Conditional Effect Of Electoral Systems Andmentioning
How do electoral systems and intraparty candidate selection procedures affect party unity? In this article, I distinguish theoretically and empirically between electoral systems and candidate selections and argue that the influence of selection processes on parties' behavior is conditional on electoral system (and vice versa). Measuring parties' unity using Rice and weighted Rice scores, and applying hierarchical models to a new data set of 249 parties in 24 countries, I find support for the claim that the influence of selection processes on behavior is greater under electoral systems that encourage personal vote-seeking incentives than under electoral systems that encourage party centeredness.Maintaining a unified party voting record is an important objective for both party leaders and rank-and-file members. Unified parties aid policy implementation and improve stability in both parliamentary and presidential systems. Without party unity, in presidential systems, the president's base of legislative support becomes less stable and predictable, whereas in parliamentary systems government survival might be threatened. Additionally, a unified party record helps enhance the party's electoral performance, as it creates a clear brand name with which voters identify. Lastly, within the legislative arena, a unified party record reduces transaction costs in log rolling, increases policy-making capabilities, decreases legislative unpredictability, and amplifies legislative efficiency. Indeed, disciplined-unified parties are regarded as one of the pillars of the responsible party government doctrine (Ranney 1954).What explains the degree to which parties behave as a unified actor? Scholars have long argued that electoral systems and intraparty candidate selection processes (i.e., the manner by which a party decides who can represent it on its ballot) shape the balance legislators strike between emphasizing their unique personal reputation and the collective LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, 00, 00, month 2016
“…Thus, for instance, various scholars could not detect differing voting behaviors across parliamentarians who are elected under the PR tier and those elected under the SMD tiers in countries that use mixed‐member electoral systems (Crisp ; Jun and Hix ; Rich ), while others find only modest support for electoral systems' effect in a cross‐national analysis (Depauw and Martin ; Sieberer ).…”
Section: The Separate and Conditional Effect Of Electoral Systems Andmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Based on Carey and Shugart's () research, I hypothesize: H1 (Separate Effect of Electoral Systems) : The more permissive an electoral system is (ballot type, pool, and vote encouraging personal vote‐seeking incentives), the less unified parties' voting record will be (and vice versa).The vast empirical research that tried to test the expectations that stemmed from Carey and Shugart's article that parties under personal vote‐seeking electoral systems should exhibit lower levels of unity compared to parties in party‐centered systems yield inconclusive and indecisive results. Scholars used a case‐study prism to study the effect of electoral systems on legislators' and parties' behavior (Desposato ; Samuels ), while some took advantage of the unique quasi‐experimental design of mixed‐member electoral systems (Crisp ; Haspel, Remingron, and Smith ; Herron ; Jun and Hix ; Kunicova and Remington ; Rich ; Sieberer ). Still others utilize a cross‐country framework (Carey ; Depauw and Martin ; Sieberer ).…”
Section: The Separate and Conditional Effect Of Electoral Systems Andmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The empirical inconclusiveness might be explained by the effect of party nomination. Party nomination may refer to nomination to “mega seats” (Kam ; Martin ), nomination to legislators' postparliamentary careers (Carey ; Hix ; Jun and Hix ), and nomination within the legislative electoral game, that is, candidate selection procedures (Jun and Hix ; Preece ; Rich ). Literature on the first two types of party nominations emphasized that they interact with the electoral rules in explaining voting behavior (e.g., Jun and Hix ).…”
Section: The Separate and Conditional Effect Of Electoral Systems Andmentioning
How do electoral systems and intraparty candidate selection procedures affect party unity? In this article, I distinguish theoretically and empirically between electoral systems and candidate selections and argue that the influence of selection processes on parties' behavior is conditional on electoral system (and vice versa). Measuring parties' unity using Rice and weighted Rice scores, and applying hierarchical models to a new data set of 249 parties in 24 countries, I find support for the claim that the influence of selection processes on behavior is greater under electoral systems that encourage personal vote-seeking incentives than under electoral systems that encourage party centeredness.Maintaining a unified party voting record is an important objective for both party leaders and rank-and-file members. Unified parties aid policy implementation and improve stability in both parliamentary and presidential systems. Without party unity, in presidential systems, the president's base of legislative support becomes less stable and predictable, whereas in parliamentary systems government survival might be threatened. Additionally, a unified party record helps enhance the party's electoral performance, as it creates a clear brand name with which voters identify. Lastly, within the legislative arena, a unified party record reduces transaction costs in log rolling, increases policy-making capabilities, decreases legislative unpredictability, and amplifies legislative efficiency. Indeed, disciplined-unified parties are regarded as one of the pillars of the responsible party government doctrine (Ranney 1954).What explains the degree to which parties behave as a unified actor? Scholars have long argued that electoral systems and intraparty candidate selection processes (i.e., the manner by which a party decides who can represent it on its ballot) shape the balance legislators strike between emphasizing their unique personal reputation and the collective LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, 00, 00, month 2016
“…For example, despite expectations (e.g. Herron, 2002;Sieberer, 2010) that district legislators will be more likely to deviate from the party position than party-list legislators, Rich (2014) finds no significant difference between tiers in Taiwan, due to strong party discipline. Others have identified clear differences in perceptions between district and party-list legislators (e.g.…”
To what extent do electoral institutions influence positions on same-sex marriage? Debates over samesex marriage legislation have increased globally for the past 20 years, yet little research focuses on either debates in East Asia or the affect of electoral institutions. Using an original dataset on Taiwanese legislators and their public stances on same-sex marriage, this research finds that legislators elected under proportional representation (PR) are consistently more likely to support same-sex marriage laws than their counterparts elected in single-member districts (SMDs), even after controlling for partisanship. The results here not only highlight overlooked institutional influences on support, but also tie the broader literature on mixedmember systems to the growing research on same-sex marriage rights.
“…A fair share of this literature concentrated on the debate regarding the specialization versus contamination (Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa, ) of roles and activities of MPs elected in different electoral tiers of mixed electoral systems. Although the findings of studies analyzing the voting loyalty of MPs elected from different tiers remain inconclusive (Rich, ), other studies have shown that in mixed electoral systems the type of seat influences the MPs’ campaign style, and later on their behavior in the Parliament (Rich, ). However, these studies did not make the additional step: measuring directly the connection between campaign communication and socialization and legislative behavior.…”
Objectives. Although a salient component of parliamentary delegation and accountability chains, the connection between individual campaigning and parliamentary behavior has not been measured systematically by empirical research. This study assesses the importance of campaign strategies and activities for constituency service. Methods. We draw on an original data set combining the responses of 234 members of Parliament (MPs) participating at the 2010 Hungarian Candidate Study with their subsequent parliamentary questions. We content analyzed the questions and ran negative binomial regressions to evaluate if and how campaign activities influenced the MPs to introduce locally-oriented questions. Results. Our analyses show that a form of campaign socialization, the time devoted to meet local activists during campaigns, is a key predictor for the likelihood of introducing constituency questions, whereas campaign norms and messages matter less. Conclusions. Ultimately, even though campaigns matter for constituency service, the MPs' shadowing behavior, their socialization in local politics, and their partisan affiliation is likely to matter more.
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