Patent Licensing: Stackelberg Versus Cournot Models

Bode, Oana Ruxandra; Ferreira, Flávio

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-01411-1_23

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 19 publications

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“…A direct comparison between the Stackelberg duopoly model and the Cournot duopoly model for the case of the two-part tariff licensing was done. By considering the same differentiated Stackelberg duopoly model, when the leader firm engages itself in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation, Ferreira and Tuns (2012) studied the licensing of the cost-reduction by a per-unit royalty and a fixed-fee licensing (see also Bode et al, 2014).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Licensing under Cournot vs Bertrand competition

Ferreira

Bode

2020

Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Licensing under Cournot vs Bertrand competition

Ferreira

Bode

2020

Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja

Self Cite

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Integrate multi-agent planning in hinterland transport: Design, implementation and evaluation

Feng

Pang

Lodewijks

2015

Advanced Engineering Informatics

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Firms’ Technological Strategic Choices: A Perspective of the Behavioral Biases

et al. 2021

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To reveal the mechanisms of firms’ technological strategic choices between innovation and imitation, an evolutionary game model is proposed from the perspective of the behavioral biases. First, behavioral biases such as reference point dependence, loss aversion, and probability weighting can be defined and modeled based on the prospect theory. Second, according to the firm theory, a Cournot or Stackelberg game modeled with a technology spillover effect and intellectual property protection is applied to portray the interaction between firms. Third, an improved evolutionary game model is provided by incorporating behavioral biases into the framework of the decision-making process. Finally, the simulation analysis of some important factors, such as intellectual property protection, patent fees, innovation risks, decision-making attitudes, and consumers’ price preference on firms’ technological strategic choices, is presented. The corresponding results show that (1) innovation risk is an important factor affecting the technological strategic choices of firms, (2) increasing the intellectual property protection and the patent fee for technology transfer can effectively control the spillover effect of technology, (3) there is a partial U-shaped relationship between the consumers’ price preference and innovation, and (4) the behavioral biases such as reference point dependence, loss aversion, and probability weighting will change the perception of payoff and risk and will eventually induce firms to adopt the innovation strategy.

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Patent Licensing: Stackelberg Versus Cournot Models

Cited by 3 publications

References 19 publications

Licensing under Cournot vs Bertrand competition

Licensing under Cournot vs Bertrand competition

Integrate multi-agent planning in hinterland transport: Design, implementation and evaluation

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Firms’ Technological Strategic Choices: A Perspective of the Behavioral Biases

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