2019
DOI: 10.1017/s1365100519000099
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Patent Protection, Optimal Licensing, and Innovation With Endogenous Entry

Abstract: How does patent policy affect innovation when patent licensing is crucial for firms? To address this question, the present study incorporates voluntary patent licensing between an innovator and followers, as discussed in the literature of industrial organization, into a dynamic general equilibrium model. Unlike previous studies, both the licensing fee and the number of licensees are endogenously determined by the innovator’s maximization and the free-entry condition. Using this model, we show that strong paten… Show more

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Cited by 5 publications
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References 38 publications
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“…A similar setup is presented in Suzuki (), which examines the optimal licensing strategy of patent holders.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A similar setup is presented in Suzuki (), which examines the optimal licensing strategy of patent holders.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%