Paternalism

Abstract

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Mitigating Servility: Policies of Egalitarian Self-Relations

“…Secondly, some may object to the paternalistic part of my argument on the grounds that paternalism is sometimes considered to compromise rather than further self-respect. To elaborate, paternalistic reasons are often rejected as unwarranted for interfering in self-regarding matters because they rely on the assumption (whether empirically sound or not) on the part of paternalist agents that their judgment is, in some respect, superior when it comes to advancing the good of those exposed to an intervention (Anderson 1999;Begon 2016;Flanigan 2017;Husak 1981;Quong 2011;Shiffrin 2000;Tsai 2014). Following this line of reasoning, it may appear paradoxical to claim that we can make people relate to themselves in a more egalitarian manner by treating them in a way that allegedly communicates to them that they are in some respect inferior.…”

On the Possibility (and Acceptability) of Paternalism towards Future People

“…(a) aimed to have (or to avoid) an effect on B or her sphere of legitimate agency 6 (b) that involves the substitution of A's judgment or agency for B's (c) directed at B's own interests or matters that legitimately lie within B's control (d) undertaken on the grounds that compared to B's judgment or agency with respect to those interests or other matters, A regards her judgment or agency to be, in some respect, superior to B's (Shiffrin, 2000: 218) 7 8 As Begon (2016) notes, this account, and like-minded motivational accounts of paternalism, 9 focuses not only on the nature of the choice interfered with (what the paternalised wants to do) but on the motive of the paternaliser, 10 identifying paternalist acts "on the basis of the uniquely insulting negative judgment that is taken to motivate all instances of paternalism" (Begon, 2016: 360). I am aware that this definition of paternalism is not without its potentially weak spots.…”

Is Anti-Paternalism Enough?

“…Many agree that paternalistically justified policies and actions express a problematic attitude of disrespect toward the people interfered with (see e.g. Anderson, 1999: 301–302; Begon, 2016: 364; Flanigan, 2016; Shiffrin, 2000: 207). For the same reasons, avoiding paternalism is often seen, at least, as an important desideratum.…”

“…Coercion is always an affront to autonomy, something that deflects the person from directing his or her path in accordance with his or her own will and not with that of another (Blake, 2001; Raz, 1986). Coercing people for their own good evinces a problematic attitude of disrespect on the part of the coercer, implying that the coercer questions the capability of the coercees to run their own lives (Anderson, 1999: 301–302; Begon, 2016: 364; (Flanigan, 2016; Shiffrin, 2000: 207, 231). This, as opposed to the avoidance of harshness, makes the avoidance of insouciance, at least, prima facie morally problematic.…”