2022
DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2114244
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Pathways of post-conflict violence in Colombia

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Cited by 11 publications
(4 citation statements)
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References 27 publications
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“…Colombian government officials have blamed criminal groups and economies for the wave of targeted assassinations of activists and local leaders since 2016 (Albarracín et al 2022). This follows both a historical and global trend of governments diffusing blame when activists are killed in conflict zones.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Colombian government officials have blamed criminal groups and economies for the wave of targeted assassinations of activists and local leaders since 2016 (Albarracín et al 2022). This follows both a historical and global trend of governments diffusing blame when activists are killed in conflict zones.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Data on the assassination of social leaders was collected in 2021 from Datasketch, a website that compiles reports from various human rights and media organizations in Colombia. While observers noted that the targeting of social leaders constituted a serious problem to Colombian civil society throughout the country's armed conflict, organizations across the country only systematically began collecting data and coding assassinations of social leaders as a specific category of violence after the 2016 Colombian peace agreement with the FARC (Albarracín et al 2022).…”
Section: Panel Data Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, data from Colombia's recent past demonstrates that ex‐combatants often live a precarious existence that may be perceived as dangerous or unstable by others (Albarracin et al. 2022a, 2022b; Kaplan and Nussio 2018). Hypothesis 3 : Individuals who live in neighborhoods they perceive as unsafe will be less likely to trust former combatants. …”
Section: Argument: Fear Familiarity and The Reintegration Of Former C...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, in these peripheral territories, the inability of state institutions to regulate the life of local populations, as well as the presence of illegal armed groups, is not however necessarily related to the prevalence of chaos and disorder. On the contrary, the literature has widely shown that local orders are developed in these areas that exceed the governing capacity of the state (Uribe, 1999; Mampilly, 2011; Arjona et al, 2015; Péclard and Mechoulan, 2015; Arjona, 2016; Gutiérrez, 2019; Albarracín et al, 2022). In this way, different forms of rebel governance have been built depending on the plurality of actors, their purposes and the contexts (Gutiérrez, 2018).…”
Section: Construction Of Local Orders and Peasant Agencies In The War...mentioning
confidence: 99%