Abstract:The role of compensation or extrinsic rewards, including pay for performance (PFP), has received relatively little attention in the organizational behavior/psychology literature on work motivation. What attention it has received has often taken the form of raising cautions about the potential harmful effects of PFP on (intrinsic) work motivation, as well as on creativity. We critically assess the theory and evidence that have provided the basis for such arguments and conclude that support for such claims (in w… Show more
“…This effect varies depending on the impact that the reward has on feelings of autonomy and feelings of competence (Moller & Deci, 2014 Even though base pay can be influenced by annual merit pay increases based on results and/or (evaluations of) behavior, it is much less dependent on recent performance than variable PFP. Relying on instrumentality theories and reviews of the compensation literature (Gerhart & Fang, 2015;Gerhart et al, 2009), we should therefore not expect that the amount of base pay will impact on work effort through controlled motivation. Relying on SDT, however, the amount of base pay can influence other relevant employee outcomes if it is interpreted as recognition of competence, as autonomy supportive, or as fostering relatedness (Gagné & Forest, 2008).…”
Section: Pay Motivation and Work Effortmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Pay for performance (PFP) refers to pay programs in which pay is contingent on performance and where performance can be measured in terms of results (e.g., number of sales) or (evaluations of) behavior (Gerhart & Fang, 2015). Tying individual PFP to results-based criteria has the capacity to generate strong motivational effects, and there is meta-analytical evidence for a positive relation between individual variable PFP and performance quantity (Jenkins, Gupta, Mitra, & Shaw, 1998), performance on simple tasks (Stajkovic & Luthans, 2003), and performance on uninteresting laboratory tasks (Weibel, Rost, & Osterloh, 2010).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The current study is also the first to investigate motivation as a mediator and to include both controlled and autonomous motivation. Previous field and experimental studies of PFP have failed to directly investigate the main mechanism (i.e., motivation) that is hypothesized to explain the effects of incentives, something that has recently been called for in recent reviews of the compensation literature (Gerhart & Fang, 2015). In addition, though many organizations pay employees using different PFP components (Gerhart et al, 2009), the total compensation in most industrialized countries is composed largely of base pay, with a relatively small performance-contingent portion (Thierry, 2002).…”
This study investigated relations between pay-for-performance incentives designed to vary in instrumentality (annual pay-for-performance, quarterly pay-for-performance, and base pay level) and employee outcomes (self-reported work effort and turnover intention) in a longitudinal study spanning more than two years. After controlling for perceived instrumentality, merit pay increase, and the initial values of the dependent variables, the amount of base pay was positively related to work effort and negatively related to turnover intention, where both relationships were mediated by autonomous motivation. The amounts of quarterly and annual pay-for-performance were both positively related to controlled motivation, but were differently related to the dependent variables due to different relations with autonomous motivation.
“…This effect varies depending on the impact that the reward has on feelings of autonomy and feelings of competence (Moller & Deci, 2014 Even though base pay can be influenced by annual merit pay increases based on results and/or (evaluations of) behavior, it is much less dependent on recent performance than variable PFP. Relying on instrumentality theories and reviews of the compensation literature (Gerhart & Fang, 2015;Gerhart et al, 2009), we should therefore not expect that the amount of base pay will impact on work effort through controlled motivation. Relying on SDT, however, the amount of base pay can influence other relevant employee outcomes if it is interpreted as recognition of competence, as autonomy supportive, or as fostering relatedness (Gagné & Forest, 2008).…”
Section: Pay Motivation and Work Effortmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Pay for performance (PFP) refers to pay programs in which pay is contingent on performance and where performance can be measured in terms of results (e.g., number of sales) or (evaluations of) behavior (Gerhart & Fang, 2015). Tying individual PFP to results-based criteria has the capacity to generate strong motivational effects, and there is meta-analytical evidence for a positive relation between individual variable PFP and performance quantity (Jenkins, Gupta, Mitra, & Shaw, 1998), performance on simple tasks (Stajkovic & Luthans, 2003), and performance on uninteresting laboratory tasks (Weibel, Rost, & Osterloh, 2010).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The current study is also the first to investigate motivation as a mediator and to include both controlled and autonomous motivation. Previous field and experimental studies of PFP have failed to directly investigate the main mechanism (i.e., motivation) that is hypothesized to explain the effects of incentives, something that has recently been called for in recent reviews of the compensation literature (Gerhart & Fang, 2015). In addition, though many organizations pay employees using different PFP components (Gerhart et al, 2009), the total compensation in most industrialized countries is composed largely of base pay, with a relatively small performance-contingent portion (Thierry, 2002).…”
This study investigated relations between pay-for-performance incentives designed to vary in instrumentality (annual pay-for-performance, quarterly pay-for-performance, and base pay level) and employee outcomes (self-reported work effort and turnover intention) in a longitudinal study spanning more than two years. After controlling for perceived instrumentality, merit pay increase, and the initial values of the dependent variables, the amount of base pay was positively related to work effort and negatively related to turnover intention, where both relationships were mediated by autonomous motivation. The amounts of quarterly and annual pay-for-performance were both positively related to controlled motivation, but were differently related to the dependent variables due to different relations with autonomous motivation.
“…However, data supporting this conclusion are mixed; 6-8 rather than opposite ends of the motivation spectrum, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation appear to exist more independently than earlier thought. 9-11 A recent review of treatments for cannabis dependence demonstrated that long-term follow-up results from interventions combining contingency management (i.e., giving vouchers for abstinence) and cognitive-behavioral therapy were better than for those using just one form of treatment, 12 suggesting that interventions targeting both intrinsic and extrinsic forms of motivation to change can be efficacious.…”
Section: How May a Behavioral Economic Approach Complement Other Treamentioning
Summary
The field of behavioral economics suggests that food and activity choices are governed by costs, available alternatives, and reinforcement. Here, we review basic and translational research using a behavioral economic (BE) framework with overweight or obese children up to age 18. We address BE concepts and methods, discuss developmental issues, the continuum of BE intervention approaches, findings of studies focused on increasing the cost of unwanted behaviors (i.e., energy-dense food intake and sedentary behavior) and decreasing the cost of desired behaviors (i.e., healthy food intake and PA), and our team's recent basic behavioral studies using BE approaches with minority adolescents.
“…Specifically, as articulated in self‐determination theory (SDT; Deci and Ryan, [and in a similar vein in crowding‐out theory from the economics domain; Frey and Oberholzer‐Gee, ]), while instrumental incentives drive extrinsic motivation, by directing behaviour towards a specific outcome, the same instrumentality might undermine individuals’ intrinsic motivation, which is driven by interest or enjoyment in the task itself (Deci, ; Deci and Porac, ; Ryan and Connell, ; Ryan et al, ). After much historical debate on this topic (see reviews from Deci et al, and Gerhart and Fang, ), in the most recent meta‐analysis, Cerasoli and colleagues (, p. 996) concluded that:…”
Perceptions of manager discretion in incentive allocation are theoretically and practically important to help explain the much‐debated relationship between performance‐related bonuses and intrinsic motivation. We argue, and demonstrate, that perceived managerial discretion is a key moderator to this relationship because of its relevance to procedural fairness. In a first study, we developed a measure for perceived manager discretion and distinguished it from related concepts. In a second experiment, we found that higher bonuses associated with higher levels of perceived manager discretion enhanced procedural fairness but those based on lower discretion did not. In a third field study, we found that actual bonuses implemented by a service organization enhanced intrinsic motivation indirectly through procedural fairness, but only when employees perceived their bonus to be based on higher levels of perceived manager discretion. Conversely, when bonus level was associated with lower perceived manager discretion, it negatively predicted of intrinsic motivation.
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