F l o r i d a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t yI n Ruback, Gladfelter, and Lantz's (2014, this issue) study, we learn something simple and profound-that providing probationers with basic information about their restitution payment obligations, such as how much they owe, increases the likelihood that they will make payments. The benefits (i.e., increased payments) seem to exceed greatly the labor time and postage costs of providing restitution information to probationers.There is, of course, the question of why. Perhaps the letters reminded probationers of their obligation and led them to view restitution as the morally right thing to do. Perhaps, more simply, the letters reminded them of what they were supposed to do and provided pragmatic information on which they could act (e.g., the amount due and where to send payments). The latter explanation seems the most plausible. For example, as part of the experimental design, the researchers provided one group with the information along with a rationale for why the probationers should pay. Including the rationale did not seem to lead to more payments and, indeed, could have reduced them. (Probationers might have resented being told what to do or the idea that they were being judged.)Many interesting implications flow from this study. For example, what if providing information can change probationer behavior more so than can threats? What if sanctions were structured in ways that did not rest solely on the notion of fear (i.e., deterrence), moral change, or rehabilitation, but rather the sanctions included a focus on providing information about obligations associated with probation? Even a small improvement might provide benefits that have ripple effects throughout the correctional system. For example, a considerable number of individuals in prison today are there because they previously had a "shot" at probation and failed in some way (e.g., through new crimes or violations of the