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Research on neighborhoods and crime is on a remarkable growth trajectory. In this article, we survey important recent developments in the scholarship on neighborhood effects and the spatial stratification of poverty and urban crime. We advance the case that, in understanding the impact of neighborhoods and poverty on crime, sociological and criminological research would benefit from expanding the analytical focus from residential neighborhoods to the network of neighborhoods individuals are exposed to during their daily routine activities. This perspective is supported by reemerging scholarship on activity spaces and macro-level research on inter-neighborhood connections. We highlight work indicating that non-residential contexts add variation in criminogenic exposure, which in turn influence offending behavior and victimization risk. Also, we draw on recent insights from research on gang violence, social and institutional connections, and spatial mismatch, and call for advancements in the scholarship on urban poverty that investigates the salience of inter-neighborhood connections in evaluating the spatial stratification of criminogenic risk for individuals and communities.

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Research SummaryMost crime victims do not receive the restitution they are owed. This study is an experiment that addresses two reasons offenders give for why they do not pay their court-ordered restitution: (a) lack of understanding of how much they owe and where their payments are directed and (b) a belief that the sanctions are unfair. A total of 771 offenders were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 × 2 between-subjects design in which, over a 6-month period, three quarters of the offenders received monthly letters that contained (a) information or no information about the economic sanctions they had paid and what they still owed (Information manipulation) and (b) a statement or no statement about reasons for paying restitution (Rationale manipulation). The remaining offenders did not receive a letter. The results 1 year after the experiment began (6 months after the last letter had been sent) indicated that offenders who had received letters containing information (Information condition) paid significantly more money and made significantly more monthly payments than did offenders in the other three experimental conditions. A cost-effectiveness analysis indicated that for every dollar spent on the experimental manipulation, approximately $6.44 in restitution was received.

Research Summary Restitution is court‐ordered payment by an offender to compensate a crime victim for direct tangible losses resulting from the crime. Making regular restitution payments, it has been argued, may serve as a continual reminder to offenders of the harm they caused and their need to restore justice. In this study, we examined the recidivism of offenders who were delinquent in paying restitution and who had participated in a prior experiment aimed at testing whether receiving monthly letters would increase their payment of restitution. Findings from that experiment revealed that offenders who had received letters containing information about the economic sanctions they had paid and what they still owed paid a significantly larger proportion of the restitution owed and made significantly more monthly payments than did offenders in the other three experimental conditions. Results of the present follow‐up study revealed that even though recidivists (as measured by a new arrest) and nonrecidivists did not differ significantly in the amount of restitution they owed, nonrecidivists were more likely to have paid something toward the restitution they owed and more likely to have made more monthly payments. Statistical tests indicated that payment mediated the relationship between the experimental manipulation of information and observed recidivism, suggesting that the experimental manipulation of information led to more payments that, in turn, led to less recidivism. Policy Implications The findings from the prior experiment indicated that offenders who had received information about the economic sanctions they had paid and what they still owed were more likely to make payments. In that study, scholars concluded that giving offenders this information was cost‐effective, in that for every dollar spent, more than $6 in restitution was received. The results of this follow‐up analysis of recidivism demonstrate that the cost‐effectiveness of providing information is greater than previously indicated. At a cost of $64.19 per day for jail in Pennsylvania, the difference of 46.4 days between offenders who received information and those in the other experimental conditions could be as much as $2,978.42 per offender, less the costs of monitoring payments.