Paying vs. waiting in the pursuit of specific egalitarianism

Abstract

We propose an allocation mechanism for publicly providing a private good such that the final allocation is simultaneously independent of income and increasing in strength of preference or need. The "pay or wait" mechanism consists of offering the good for sale at two outlets. The 'queuing' outlet would charge a low money price per unit, but high waiting timer per unit. The 'pricing' outlet would charge a relatively high money price with rapid service. High wage individuals will opt for the pricing outlet, and low wage individuals the queuing outlet. If the policy maker stocks the outlets in proportion to the distribution of high and low wage earners in the population, consumers of both wages will purchase the same amount on average, while those who value the good more relative to other goods will receive more of it. These outcomes are at risk if the good can be privately resold, but may be preserved if the policy maker can create transactions costs associated with resale.

A reference-dependent approach to WTP for priority

“…According to prior studies, some customers are not worried about time constraints and they are willing to wait (Riganti & Nijkamp, 2008). Indeed, they prefer to wait rather than to pay extra money for a faster service (Clark & Kim, 2007;Matthew et al, 2012). For this group of people, money may be more important than time (Friedman & Friedman, 1997).…”

“…For example, high-income commuters are more willing to pay to reduce their travel time (Mishra et al, 2014). Moreover, people with a higher economic status tend to choose services that offer no waiting time (Clark & Kim, 2007), as they have a less favourable attitude towards waiting (Mishra et al, 2014). As Kostecki (1996) explains, higher-income individuals generally place a high value on their time, and thus a high cost on waiting and display a high intolerance toward delays.…”

Public and Private Hospitals, Congestion, and Redistribution

“…We show that congestion in the public hospital relaxes incentive compatibility constraints and enhances income redistribution. Clark and Kim () also study an in‐kind redistributive mechanism that enables the self‐selection of types. Assuming only two types of agents (high and low ability), they show that a pricing mechanism consisting in offering the target good at high money price and low time price or at a low money price but high time price achieves commodity‐specific egalitarianism when types are not observable.…”

Re-thinking queue culture: the commodification of thick time

“…Racial issues (Schwartz, 1978b) poverty and homelessness (Auyero, 2011) and other aspects of perceived unfairness (Avi-Itzhak et al, 2008) collided with the more utopian norms. Increasingly the waiting line was commoditized (Clark and Kim, 2007;Taylor, 1994). It was managed, designed and operated by those entrusted with improving the "service encounter," or assuring that those with means and resources felt welcomed in the increasingly administered waiting lines, lists, rooms and technologically mediated waiting queues.…”