Payment for Environmental “Self-Service”: Exploring the Links Between Farmers' Motivation and Additionality in a Conservation Incentive Programme in the Bolivian Andes

Bottazzi, Patrick; Wiik, Emma; Crespo, David; Jones, Julia P. G.

doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.03.032

Cited by 60 publications

(70 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…Therefore the Watershared scheme is relevant to those interested in the design of conservation incentive schemes such as PES. In exchange for enrolling parcels of land in Watershared agreements, farmers receive varied forms of support (including fruit trees, bee boxes, irrigation material and barbed wire) to help shift away from swidden agriculture and improve livestock management (Bottazzi, Wiik, Crespo, & Jones, ). More than 210,000 ha belonging to 4,500 families are under agreements (Asquith, ).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As with many such schemes, not all land enrolled represented additional conservation (additionality was ca. 13%; Bottazzi et al, ) and there were barriers to entry leading to higher uptake by households with formal land title, larger homes, cattle, and stronger social connections (Grillos, ). Uptake (percentage of a community area under Watershared agreements) was highly variable across the treated communities (Figure b), varying from 3 to 80% (median = 14%).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Experimental evaluation of the impact of a payment for environmental services program on deforestation

Wiik

d’Annunzio²,

Pynegar

et al. 2019

Conservat Sci and Prac

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Despite calls for greater use of randomized control trials (RCTs) to evaluate the impact of conservation interventions; such experimental evaluations remain extremely rare. Payments for environmental services (PES) are widely used to slow tropical deforestation but there is widespread recognition of the need for better evidence of effectiveness. A Bolivian nongovernmental organization took the unusual step of randomizing the communities where its conservation incentive program (Watershared) was offered. We explore the impact of the program on deforestation over 5 years by applying generalized additive models to Global Forest Change (GFC) data. The “intention‐to‐treat” model (where units are analyzed as randomized regardless of whether the intervention was delivered as planned) shows no effect; deforestation did not differ between the control and treatment communities. However, uptake of the intervention varied across communities so we also explored whether higher uptake might reduce deforestation. We found evidence of a small effect at high uptake but the result should be treated with caution. RCTs will not always be appropriate for evaluating conservation interventions due to ethical and practical considerations. Despite these challenges, randomization can improve causal inference and deserves more attention from those interested in improving the evidence base for conservation.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experimental evaluation of the impact of a payment for environmental services program on deforestation

Wiik

d’Annunzio²,

Pynegar

et al. 2019

Conservat Sci and Prac

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Watershared is not a PES scheme according to the original definition involving buyers and sellers of services (Wunder, 2007), however it does involve "voluntary transactions between service users and service providers that are conditional on agreed rules of natural resource management for generating offsite services" (Wunder, 2015). In exchange for enrolling parcels of land in Watershared agreements, farmers receive varied forms of support (including fruit trees, bee boxes, irrigation material and barbed wire) to help shift away from swidden agriculture and improve livestock management (Bottazzi, Wiik, Crespo, & Jones, 2018). In exchange for enrolling parcels of land in Watershared agreements, farmers receive varied forms of support (including fruit trees, bee boxes, irrigation material and barbed wire) to help shift away from swidden agriculture and improve livestock management (Bottazzi, Wiik, Crespo, & Jones, 2018).…”

Section: Study Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While it is difficult to draw comparisons across countries with different economies, the value of the incentives in Watershared are low compared with other program (the value of the incentives for the most restricting agreements is $10 a hectare plus the equivalent of a $100 value joining bonus, but just $1 a hectare for the least restricting agreements; SI 2). There is evidence that farmers enroll due to the perception that they or their community will benefit from improved water quality (Bottazzi et al, 2018). Those promoting Watershared argue that it works through nudging, by emphasizing environmental norms and reciprocity rather than paying the opportunity cost, so the level of incentives is relatively unimportant (Asquith, 2016).…”

Section: How Could the Impact Of The Watershared Program Be Increased?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Experimental evaluation of the impact of a payment for environmental services program on deforestation

Wiik

d’Annunzio²,

Pynegar

et al. 2019

Conservation Science and Practice

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“…What we could not explore, because the program was still underway at the time of this work, is whether the behaviours persist when the funding is no longer coming in (Dayer et al ). We do, however, make a preliminary assessment of whether the program is likely to result in additionality, clear increases in some environmental conditions relative to a baseline, described by some as the holy grail of payments for ecosystem service programs (Bottazzi et al ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring motivation crowding around farmer incentives for riparian management in Nova Scotia

Sherren¹,

Tourangeau²,

Lamarque

et al. 2019

Canadian Geographies / Géographies canadiennes

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Key Messages• Intrinsic motivations to do riparian management were not crowded out as a result of learning about the potential for an incentive program. • Motivation crowding from program participation was unable to be tested.• Strongly intrinsic motivations were reported overall, particularly for wildlife stewardship, risking low additionality from the investment. AbstractIncentive programs to encourage landowners to protect habitat should be carefully designed to avoid motivation crowding: basically, replacing intrinsic reasons such as a land ethic with extrinsic ones like payments. Little research on motivation crowding tests real programs, and no such work has been done in Canada. We surveyed farmers in Nova Scotia in 2017 to explore whether participation in a new incentive program called Wood Turtle Strides, or knowledge about a similar incentive program potentially available in the future, would alter reported motivations to use riparian setbacks and buffers. Motivations to use setbacks or buffers were heavily intrinsic across all four survey cohorts: wildlife stewardship and sacrifice motivated actions more than social pressures. We were not able to statistically test for motivational crowding due to low program uptake and thus post-program survey responses, but there was no evidence of second-hand crowding: farmers being motivated by hearing about a program in an adjacent jurisdiction. Findings point to the significance of wildlife stewardship for many farmers, and persistent resistance to conservation among others, as well as a risk of low additionality. More post-program research is necessary to fully understand the program's net impact on motivations and conservation.

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Payment for Environmental “Self-Service”: Exploring the Links Between Farmers' Motivation and Additionality in a Conservation Incentive Programme in the Bolivian Andes

Cited by 60 publications

References 48 publications

Experimental evaluation of the impact of a payment for environmental services program on deforestation

Experimental evaluation of the impact of a payment for environmental services program on deforestation

Experimental evaluation of the impact of a payment for environmental services program on deforestation

Exploring motivation crowding around farmer incentives for riparian management in Nova Scotia

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