Peer-to-peer and community-based markets: A comprehensive review

Sousa, Tiago; Soares, Tiago; Pinson, Pierre; Moret, Fabio; Baroche, Thomas; Sorin, Etienne

doi:10.1016/j.rser.2019.01.036

Cited by 754 publications

(441 citation statements)

References 68 publications

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“…Algorithm 1: Algorithm to form a stable coalition structure for P2P trading. 1: for time slot t = 1 to T do 2:…”

Section: Coalition Formation Algorithmmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The extensive growth in distributed energy resources in recent times is not only able to supply the growing energy demand of the consumers, but can also facilitate a notable mix of clean renewable energy into the grid [1]. For this reason, it is critical to enable extensive participation of owners of these assets in the deregulated energy market to provide frequency control services, demand response, profit maximization, operation reliability, planning, combating uncertainty in generation, and managing networked distribution system [2].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A coalition formation game framework for peer-to-peer energy trading

et al. 2020

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This paper studies social cooperation backed peer-to-peer energy trading technique by which prosumers can decide how they can use their batteries opportunistically for participating in the peer-to-peer trading. The objective is to achieve a solution in which the ultimate beneficiaries are the prosumers, i.e., a prosumer-centric solution. To do so, a coalition formation game is designed, which enables a prosumer to compare its benefit of participating in the peer-to-peer trading with and without using its battery and thus, allows the prosumer to form suitable social coalition groups with other similar prosumers in the network for conducting peer-to-peer trading. The properties of the formed coalitions are studied, and it is shown that 1) the coalition structure that stems from the social cooperation between participating prosumers at each time slot is both stable and optimal, and 2) the outcomes of the proposed peerto-peer trading scheme is prosumer-centric. Case studies are conducted based on real household energy usage and solar generation data to highlight how the proposed scheme can benefit prosumers through exhibiting prosumer-centric properties.

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“…Algorithm 1: Algorithm to form a stable coalition structure for P2P trading. 1: for time slot t = 1 to T do 2:…”

Section: Coalition Formation Algorithmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A coalition formation game framework for peer-to-peer energy trading

et al. 2020

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“…Finally, [18] develops a cooperative game theoretic approach for incentivizing prosumers to form coalitions for P2P trading. A detail overview of different P2P energy market models can also be found in [32].…”

Section: General Focus Of the Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

A motivational game-theoretic approach for peer-to-peer energy trading in the smart grid

et al. 2019

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Peer-to-peer trading in energy networks is expected to be exclusively conducted by the prosumers of the network with negligible influence from the grid. This raises the critical question: how can enough prosumers be encouraged to participate in peer-to-peer trading so as to make its operation sustainable and beneficial to the overall electricity network? To this end, this paper proposes how a motivational psychology framework can be used effectively to design peer-to-peer energy trading to increase user participation. To do so, first, the state-of-the-art of peer-to-peer energy trading literature is discussed by following a systematic classification, and gaps in existing studies are identified. Second, a motivation psychology framework is introduced, which consists of a number of motivational models that a prosumer needs to satisfy before being convinced to participate in energy trading. Third, a game-theoretic peer-to-peer energy trading scheme is developed, its relevant properties are studied, and it is shown that the coalition among different prosumers is a stable coalition. Fourth, through numerical case studies, it is shown that the proposed model can reduce carbon emissions by 18.38% and 9.82% in a single day in Summer and Winter respectively compared to a feed-in-tariff scheme. The proposed scheme is also shown to reduce the cost of energy up to 118 ¢ and 87 ¢ per day in Summer and Winter respectively. Finally, how the outcomes of the scheme satisfy all the motivational psychology models is discussed, which subsequently shows its potential to attract users to participate in energy trading.

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“…Instead of a centralized market design where all the operations have been managed by a global central market operator [17,29,33], new decentralized models emerge. These models involve local energy communities which can trade energy, either by the intermediate of a global market operator [13], or in a peer-to-peer setting [26,32]. Peer-to-peer energy trading allows flexible energy trades between peers, where, for instance, local prosumers exchange between them energy surplus from multiple small-scale distributed energy resources (DERs) [15,16].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Peer-to-peer electricity market analysis: From variational to Generalized Nash Equilibrium

Cadre¹,

Jacquot

Wan³

et al. 2020

European Journal of Operational Research

124

134

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We consider a network of prosumers involved in peer-to-peer energy exchanges, with differentiation price preferences on the trades with their neighbors, and we analyze two market designs: (i) a centralized market, used as a benchmark, where a global market operator optimizes the flows (trades) between the nodes, local demand and flexibility activation to maximize the system overall social welfare; (ii) a distributed peer-to-peer market design where prosumers in local energy communities optimize selfishly their trades, demand, and flexibility activation.We first characterize the solution of the peer-to-peer market as a Variational Equilibrium and prove that the set of Variational Equilibria coincides with the set of social welfare optimal solutions of market design (i). We give several results that help understanding the structure of the trades at an equilibrium or at the optimum. We characterize the impact of preferences on the network line congestion and renewable energy waste under both designs. We provide a reduced example for which we give the set of all possible generalized equilibria, which enables to give an approximation of the price of anarchy. We provide a more realistic example which relies on the IEEE 14-bus network, for which we can simulate the trades under different preference prices. Our analysis shows in particular that the preferences have a large impact on the structure of the trades, but that one equilibrium (variational) is optimal.

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Peer-to-peer and community-based markets: A comprehensive review

Cited by 754 publications

References 68 publications

A coalition formation game framework for peer-to-peer energy trading

A coalition formation game framework for peer-to-peer energy trading

A motivational game-theoretic approach for peer-to-peer energy trading in the smart grid

Peer-to-peer electricity market analysis: From variational to Generalized Nash Equilibrium

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