Perceptual Variation and Structuralism

Abstract

I use an old challenge to motivate a new view. The old challenge is due to variation in our perceptions of secondary qualities. The challenge is to say whose perceptions are accurate. The new view is about how we manage to perceive secondary qualities, and thus manage to perceive them accurately or inaccurately. I call it perceptual structuralism. I first introduce the challenge and point out drawbacks with traditional responses. I spend the rest of the paper motivating and defending a structuralist response. While I focus on color, both the challenge and the view generalize to the other secondary qualities. C 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Perceiving properties versus perceiving objects

“…I defend the view as it relates to object perception in Millar (2017). Wishon (2012), Papineau (2014), andMorrison (2020), all claim explicitly that phenomenal properties function as representational vehicles; however, there is no overlap between the motivations they offer for their views and the argument presented here. For related views, see Matthen (2005), Hatfield (2016), andLande (2018).…”

Colour Relations in Form

“…31 See the discussion of Morrison (2018) on 'region narrowing' in the next Section. One complication is that, as noted above, the colour space for chromatic edge content is likely to differ from that for monadic colour content.…”

“…Morrison (2015) defends the metaphysical relations first view. In an interesting development, Morrison (2018) suggests that Evie’s total lifetime experience of the colour relations borne by the strawberry to other objects grounds her current visual perception of its colour. This monadic colour representation may be more or less determinate, depending on how far her prior relational perception narrows down the region of colour space into which the strawberry falls.…”

Colour Relations in Black and White

“…Interpreted metaphysically, the claim is: Metaphysical Relational Determination Thesis: For any visual perceptual representation m of S at t that attributes a monadic colour property to x, there is a set Γ of visual perceptual representations of S at t attributing colour relations between x and other objects, such that Γ fully grounds m. Morrison (2015) defends this view. In an interesting development, Morrison (forthcoming) suggests that our total lifetime experience of the colour relations borne by x to other objects, up to and including those at time t, metaphysically determines the monadic colour property perceptually attributed to x at t. The determinacy of this monadic colour will depend on the extent of the subject's prior relational colour perception.…”