Performative Force, Convention, and Discursive Injustice

Kukla, Rebecca

doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2012.01316.x

Cited by 183 publications

(140 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…14 Rebecca Kukla, in a recent wonderful paper on discursive injustice (Kukla 2012), has given a view of 13 While there is lots of this which would most likely make Prior shudder, going back to one of Prior's idols, Peirce, we see similar sentiments expressed. In his (1878), immediately following his famous "The Fixation of Belief" and How to Make our Ideas Clear", Peirce says that while "It may seem strange that I should put forward three sentiments, namely, interest in an indefinite community, recognition of the possibility of this interest being made supreme, and hope in the unlimited continuance of intellectual activity, as indispensable requirements of logic.…”

Section: Prior's Modes Of Presentation and Argumentationsupporting

confidence: 49%

Prior’s Thank-Goodness Argument Reconsidered

Vine

2015

Synthese

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Arthur Prior's argument for the A-theory of time in "Thank Goodness That's Over" is perhaps his most famous and well-known non-logical work. Still, I think that this paper is one of his most misunderstood works. Because of this, much of its brilliance has yet to be properly appreciated. In this paper, I suggest that the explanation of this is that it has been treated as though it were following (what has been mythologized as) the standard model for a piece of Analytic philosophy. That is, it has been assumed that what Prior was doing was deductively demonstrating the truth of a proposition which can be discussed via any sentences with the same semantic content. Here, I argue that this assumption is wrong on two fronts:(1) Most importantly, the strongest reading of the structure of Prior's argument is as an abduction rather than as a deduction.(2) Many of the most important lessons of the argument are lost by focusing on the bare propositional content of its premise and conclusion statements. In other words, we can learn as much from the manner in which this argument is presented and expressed as we can from that which is expressed.

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Section: Prior's Modes Of Presentation and Argumentationsupporting

confidence: 49%

Prior’s Thank-Goodness Argument Reconsidered

Vine

2015

Synthese

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“…See, for example, Eagly and Karau (2002) and Valian (1998). See Kukla (2014) for insightful discussion of similar cases. the overall consequences of such a revision in public perception are likely complex.…”

Section: Structural Change As Precondition For Individual Changementioning

confidence: 99%

A Plea for Anti-Anti-Individualism: How Oversimple Psychology Misleads Social Policy

Madva¹

2016

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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This essay responds to the criticism that contemporary efforts to redress discrimination and inequality are overly individualistic. Critics of individualism emphasize that these systemic social ills stem not from the prejudice, irrationality, or selfishness of individuals, but from underlying structural-institutional forces. They are skeptical, therefore, of attempts to change individuals' attitudes while leaving structural problems intact. I argue that the insistence on prioritizing structural over individual change is problematic and misleading. My view is not that we should instead prioritize individual change, but that individual changes are integral to the success of structural changes. These theorists urge a redirection of attention, claiming that we should think less about the individual and more about the social. What they should urge instead is that we think differently about the individual, and thereby think differently about the social.

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“…So that racial slurring, for example, in a racist society versus a non-racist society will have different effects in inducing, or failing to induce, others to discriminatory acts. This difference, in effect based on circumstance, can be explained in terms of Kukla (2014) and Kukla and Lance (2009), Lance and Kukla (2013) who describe how speech acts shift norms. They introduce the notion of uptake.…”

Section: How Slurs Contribute To Oppressionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, again, accommodation has limits. This function of discourse roles limiting the moves that may be made by some speakers, thus maintaining them in a subordinate role, is related to accounts of discursive injustice (Kukla 2014). …”

Section: Explaining Variable Offencementioning

confidence: 99%

Slurs, roles and power

Popa-Wyatt

Wyatt

2017

Philos Stud

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Slurring is a kind of hate speech that has various effects. Notable among these is variable offence. Slurs vary in offence across words, uses, and the reactions of audience members. Patterns of offence aren't adequately explained by current theories. We propose an explanation based on the unjust power imbalance that a slur seeks to achieve. Our starting observation is that in discourse participants take on discourse roles. These are typically inherited from social roles, but only exist during a discourse. A slurring act is a speech-act that alters the discourse roles of the target and speaker. By assigning discourse roles the speaker unjustly changes the power balance in the dialogue. This has a variety of effects on the target and audience. We show how these notions explain all three types of offence variation. We also briefly sketch how a role and power theory can help explain silencing and appropriation. Explanatory power lies in the fact that offence is correlated with the perceived unjustness of the power imbalance created.

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Performative Force, Convention, and Discursive Injustice

Cited by 183 publications

References 9 publications

Prior’s Thank-Goodness Argument Reconsidered

Prior’s Thank-Goodness Argument Reconsidered

A Plea for Anti-Anti-Individualism: How Oversimple Psychology Misleads Social Policy

Slurs, roles and power

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