No abstract

I explore how gender can shape the pragmatics of speech. In some circumstances, when a woman deploys standard discursive conventions in order to produce a speech act with a specific performative force, her utterance can turn out, in virtue of its uptake, to have a quite different force—a less empowering force—than it would have if performed by a man. When members of a disadvantaged group face a systematic inability to produce a specific kind of speech act that they are entitled to perform—and in particular when their attempts result in their actually producing a different kind of speech act that further compromises their social position and agency—then they are victims of what I call discursive injustice. I examine three examples of discursive injustice. I contrast my account with Langton and Hornsby's account of illocutionary silencing. I argue that lack of complete control over the performative force of our speech acts is universal, and not a special marker of social disadvantage. However, women and other relatively disempowered speakers are sometimes subject to a distinctive distortion of the path from speaking to uptake, which undercuts their social agency in ways that track and enhance existing social disadvantages.

Assessing, communicating, and managing risk are among the most challenging tasks in the practice of medicine and are particularly difficult in the context of pregnancy. We analyze common scenarios in medical decision making around pregnancy, from reproductive health policy and clinical care to research protections. We describe three tendencies in these scenarios: 1) to consider the probabilities of undesirable outcomes alone, in isolation from women's values and social contexts, as determinative of individual clinical decisions and health policy; 2) to regard any risk to the fetus, including incremental risks that would in other contexts be regarded as acceptable, as trumping considerations that may be substantially more important to the wellbeing of the pregnant woman; and 3) to focus on the risks associated with undertaking medical interventions during pregnancy to the exclusion of demonstrable risks to both woman and fetus of failing to intervene. These tendencies in the perception, communication, and management of risk can lead to care that is neither evidence-based nor patient-centered, often to the detriment of both women and infants.

No abstract

The standard bioethics account is that respecting patient autonomy means ensuring that patients make their own decisions, and that requires that they give informed consent. In fact, respecting autonomy often has more to do with the overall shape and meaning of their health care regimes. Ideally, patients will sometimes take control of their health care but sometimes defer to medical authority. The physician's task is, in part, to inculcate patients into the appropriate good health care regimes.