Perilous presidentialism in Southeast Asia?

Abstract

Regional patterns have long been crucial to debates about presidentialism starting with the Latin American cases in which presidential systems were seen to have contributed to political instability. This special issue examines four cases of presidentialism in Southeast Asia. Both the 'first' wave of the presidentialism literature which focuses on 'pure' cases of presidentialism, and the 'second' wave, which concentrates on a complex mixture of presidentialism and other institutions, are relevant to Southeast Asia. Among 'pure' presidential systems, the Philippines appears to provide support to 'the perils of presidentialism' thesis given the collapse of democracy there several decades ago and periodic instability since then. But Indonesia, despite ostensibly having the additional institutional perils of multipartism, has proved stable. Among the hybrid cases of presidentialism, both Myanmar and Timor Leste have forged elite accommodation through creating presidential-style institutions, including one considered particularly unpromising for achieving political stability in the literature. Because presidentialism has been associated both with elite accommodation and stability as well as political conflict and instability, the Southeast Asia cases do not clearly demonstrate the dangers of presidentialism. They point instead to the relative lack of explanatory power of this institutional arrangement in understanding political stability.

Declining democracy: autocratization in Indonesia during the Jokowi years

“…Jokowi seeks to eliminate checks and balances by directing cartelization or cartel politics. In this context, Jokowi's behaviour endangered the presidential system in Indonesia, especially when Jokowi used his authority to issue a Perppu that was deemed unconstitutional by Constitutional Court, even though the Perppu eventually returned to the Parliament for ratification (Bünte & Thompson, 2018;Dressel & Susilo, 2023). Thus, this allows for compromise between parliament and the president to "trick or manipulate" the rules.…”

Entrepreneurship‐driven public management reforms in Southeast Asia: Critical implications for public accountability

“…For instance, the overwhelming power of the executive branch has been based on the presidential system of governance in several Southeast Asian countries, and this executive power has recently increased through the emergence of hyper‐presidential system in the Philippines, the expansion presidential influence over political parties in Indonesia, and the continuing guardianship of the military in Myanmar (Bunte & Thompson, 2018). Even under the parliamentary system of government in Thailand, the power of the executive branch increased during the rule of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra who used judicial courts, state commissions, and public agencies to enhance his power, and the executive power became overwhelming after the military coup in 2014 (Bunte & Thompson, 2018; Zawacki, 2019). This recent trend toward the rising executive power represents a considerable challenge to the balancing horizontal power of the legislative branch (Bruff & Tansel, 2019; Bunte & Thompson, 2018) needed to make the executive leaders and officials accountable.…”

“…Even under the parliamentary system of government in Thailand, the power of the executive branch increased during the rule of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra who used judicial courts, state commissions, and public agencies to enhance his power, and the executive power became overwhelming after the military coup in 2014 (Bunte & Thompson, 2018; Zawacki, 2019). This recent trend toward the rising executive power represents a considerable challenge to the balancing horizontal power of the legislative branch (Bruff & Tansel, 2019; Bunte & Thompson, 2018) needed to make the executive leaders and officials accountable.…”

Justices and Political Loyalties: An Empirical Investigation of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, 1987–2020

“…There are perceptions that appointments to the high court may create a sense of obligation, with consequences for judicial decision making, particularly in high-profile political cases. The "loyalty effects" discussed in the US context by Epstein and Posner (2016) are a growing concern for Asia's young democracies, where populist leadership and executive assertiveness are increasingly testing constitutional checks and balances (Kenny 2018;Bünte and Thompson 2018;Croissant and Haynes 2021).…”