When do objects at different times compose a further object? This is the question of diachronic composition. The universalist answers 'under any conditions whatsoever'. Others argue for restrictions on diachronic composition: composition occurs only when certain conditions are met. Recently some philosophers have argued that restrictions on diachronic compositions are motivated by our best physical theories. In Persistence and Spacetime and elsewhere, Yuri Balashov argues that diachronic compositions are restricted in terms of causal connections between object stages. In a recent paper, Nick Effingham ([2011]) argues that the standard objections to views that endorse restrictions on composition do not apply to a view that restricts composition according to compliance with the laws of nature. On the face of it, such restrictions on diachronic composition preserve our common sense ontology while eliminating from it scientifically revisionary objects that travel faster than the speed of light.I argue that these attempts to restrict diachronic composition by appealing to either causal or nomological constraints face insurmountable difficulties within the context of Special Relativity. I discuss how the universalist should best respond to Hudson's argument for superluminal objects and, in doing so, I present and defend a new sufficient condition for motion that does not entail that such objects are in superluminal motion. In stark contrast, the universalist claims that composition always occurs. The four legs and the tabletop compose a table and all current Romanian kindergarteners, Churchill's first cigar, and the southernmost Starbucks also compose a further object. In fact, for any plurality of objects that exists, there is an object that contains all and only those objects as parts. So, in addition to an ontology of tables, chairs and persons, the universalist is committed to an ontology containing innumerably-many scattered and gerrymandered objects.Restricted theories of composition deny that composition always occurs and also deny that composition never occurs. Some versions of restricted composition maintain that there are stateable informative conditions under which composition occurs, such as if the parts are in contact with one another, if they are arranged so as to give rise to a living organism, or if they are arranged so as to give rise to a conscious being. 2 Other restricted composition theorists, brutal compositionalists, grant that composition occurs sometimes, but not always, but deny that we can provide informative conditions under which composition occurs. 3 Brutal compositionalists might grant that the four legs and tabletop compose a table, but deny that there are any state-able conditions for why they do.It seems that one of the main reasons for adopting a restricted theory of composition is that it best accords with common sense: the restricted compositionalist can maintain that tables, chairs, and persons are cases where composition occurs but composition fails to occur in the case ...