1982
DOI: 10.1525/9780520313071
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Personal Rule in Black Africa

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Cited by 603 publications
(25 citation statements)
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“…Obviously, it is easy to argue that neo-patrimonial institutions function in order to enrich political leaders and maintain their personal rule. This seems to be the conventional interpretation (see Callaghy, 1984;Jackson, 1987Jackson, , 1990Jackson and Rosberg, 1982;LeVine, 1980). Yet the neopatrimonial system of rule displays significant continuity over time and with different rulers.…”
Section: Forms Of Governancementioning
confidence: 94%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Obviously, it is easy to argue that neo-patrimonial institutions function in order to enrich political leaders and maintain their personal rule. This seems to be the conventional interpretation (see Callaghy, 1984;Jackson, 1987Jackson, , 1990Jackson and Rosberg, 1982;LeVine, 1980). Yet the neopatrimonial system of rule displays significant continuity over time and with different rulers.…”
Section: Forms Of Governancementioning
confidence: 94%
“…Different conceptions pervade the literature and, hence, the nature of the security dilemma, the principal contenders for the state, and African state formation and rearticulation are matters of scholarly dispute. Jackson's (1987Jackson's ( , 1990 formulation of quasi-states, building on conclusions in Jackson and Rosberg (1982), has been very influential, however. His well-known notion of quasi-states is similar to Buzan's (1991: 100) formulation of "weak states" characterized by (1) high levels of political violence;…”
Section: Sovereignty In Africamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To ensure discretion, formal institutions are largely weak, with little or no independent oversight and regulation. With few resources and little efficiency (the result of administrative purges), state institutions have little capacity to enforce laws, regulate the economy, or collect taxes (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982). Oversight and regulatory agencies, the civil service, and the judiciary are left "weak and politicized, thereby compounding the uncertainties that flow from central policies" (Lewis, 2007, p. 20).…”
Section: State Institutions Of Law and Oversightmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The predatory regimes examined here have the largest wage bill but the smallest state employment. This paradox is the result of contradictory strategies: Predatory rulers try to build up the bureaucratic apparatus as an instrument of their will (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982) but at the same time demand absolute loyalty. Predatory rulers act to eliminate potential opponents or resistance to their extractive projects partly by purging state administrations.…”
Section: State Employmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It also shifted the readers' gaze to the legal and political maneuverings of each team. Three days after the election, The Boston Globe featured two articles that used the football metaphor: &dquo;A Touchdown for the Peo-ple&dquo; (Jackson, November 10, 2000) and &dquo;Democracy Fumbling for a Way For-ward&dquo; (Shribman, 2000). And articles such as &dquo;Seesawing Emotions Take the Campaigns on Wildest of Rides&dquo; (Bendavid & Pearson, 2000) used the football metaphor to describe the aura within political party offices.…”
Section: Revalorization Of Democracymentioning
confidence: 99%