Personalization of parliamentary behaviour: Conceptualization and empirical evidence from Belgium (1995–2014)

Abstract

Personalization of parliamentary behaviour is an underexposed aspect of the broader personalization phenomenon. It is the aim of this article to first clarify the concept of personalization in the parliamentary arena, followed by a systematic investigation of the extent to which and under which circumstances this phenomenon takes place in the Belgian context. We develop four indicators that can be used to measure parliamentary personalization over time and across countries: a rise in the use of individual parliamentary instruments, an increase in single-authored initiatives for activities that could also be conducted collectively, a larger concentration of visible parliamentary activities and an increase in party switching. Our analysis based on an original data set of parliamentary activity in the Belgian House of Representatives (1995–2014) reveals that for none of these indicators a trend of personalization could be noted.

Political personalization and personalized politics within and beyond the behavioural arena

“…Overall, the decentralized type of behavioural personalization is still only sparsely investigated, and time trends are especially lacking. In this issue, we provide some of the first studies moving in this direction (Friedman and Friedberg, 2021; Bøggild et al, 2021; Wauters et al, 2021).…”

Mavericks or Loyalists? Popular Ballot Jumpers and Party Discipline in the Flexible-List PR Context

“…Political parties need all their votes to maximize their influence over policy and satisfy the expectations of their core electorates. Recent findings indicate that preference voting might not have as strong an influence on the internal functioning of the PR system as previously believed (Buisseret and Prato 2020;Carroll and Nalepa 2021;Folke and Rickne 2020;Put, Smulders, and Maddens 2019;Wauters, Bouteca, and de Vet 2019). Emboldened by this evidence, this article put forward an argument that senior party officials will try to limit the effect of preference voting on their ability to enforce party discipline within their ranks.…”

Gender and Strategic Opposition Behavior: Patterns of Parliamentary Oversight in Belgium

“…Belgium is a typical case of a party-centered parliamentary system with fragmented multiparty coalitions and disciplined majority parties (De Winter & Dumont, 2021). Like elsewhere, opposition members in the Belgian lower house have multiple oversight tools at their disposal to control the cabinet, signal concern, and convey alternative policy views (de Vet & Devroe, 2022; Vliegenthart & Walgrave, 2011;Wauters et al, 2021). Together with the fact that Belgium has a comparatively high number of female elected officials, ranging between 35% and 40% in the research period under study (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2019), this provides us with a good case to test our hypotheses.…”