Personnel Politics: Elections, Clientelistic Competition and Teacher Hiring in Indonesia

Abstract

What is the effect of increased electoral competition on patronage politics? If programmatic appeals are not credible, institutional reforms that move politics from an elite- to a mass-focused and more competitive environment increase patronage efforts. This leads to an overall surge and notable spike in discretionary state hiring in election years. The study tests this prediction in the context of Indonesia’s decentralized education sector. The authors exploit the exogenous phasing in and timing of elections in Indonesian districts for causal identification. They find evidence of election-related increases in the number of contract teachers on local payrolls and increases in civil service teacher certifications, which dramatically increases salaries. These effects are particularly pronounced for districts in which the former authoritarian ruling party is in competition with new entrants.

Teacher Labor Markets in Developing Countries

“…One consequence of central recruitment of teachers is national political influence in the process. In Indonesia, the recruitment of contract teachers and promotions of civil service teachers increase during election years (Pierskalla and Sacks 2019). A similar electoral teacher recruitment cycle occurs in India (Fagernäs and Pelkonen 2018).…”

Combining Patronage and Merit in Public Sector Recruitment

“…He similarly argues that politicians exchange these -mainly lowranked -positions with party activists. Pierskalla and Sacks (2019) shows that the introduction of elections increased the number of teachers employed in Indonesia. In contrast, much of the seminal literature on the state suggests that electoral competition can constrain runaway state building and incentivize politicians to support meritocracy (O'Dwyer, 2006;Geddes, 1994).…”

“…My theoretical approach also sheds light on what appear to be inconsistent findings regarding the effect of electoral competition on patronage hiring. While many scholars assert that competition can promote meritocracy (Geddes, 1994;Ting et al, 2013), others find that competition can encourage clientelism, and swell the ranks of the public sector (Pierskalla and Sacks, 2019;Driscoll, 2017;Lindberg, 2003). My theory suggests that electoral competition may have both of these effects: it may dissuade politicians from interfering in hiring for high-ranked positions, while encouraging them to recruit partisans to low-ranked positions.…”

“…First, the results contribute to the literature on public sector development. It is one of the first empirical studies in political science to use administrative data to document trends in public sector hiring practices in developing countries (see also Hassan, 2016;Pierskalla and Sacks, 2019). My theoretical approach also sheds light on what appear to be inconsistent findings regarding the effect of electoral competition on patronage hiring.…”

Indonesia:

“…The same study also found that the teacher certification process was affected by politics, in particular, local election cycles. Pierskalla and Sacks (2016) observed that since the pilkada system was introduced to promote local electoral accountability, a large number of new contract teachers (about 1,200 per district) and civil servant teachers are hired before an election. Pierskalla and Sacks note that mass hiring of new teachers may have had a negative effect on student learning.…”