Perspective Taking as Egocentric Anchoring and Adjustment.

Epley, Nicholas; Keysar, Boaz; Boven, Leaf Van; Gilovich, Thomas

doi:10.1037/0022-3514.87.3.327

Cited by 1,063 publications

(998 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…These experiments extend other demonstrations that people have difficulty discounting "top-down" effects on the perception of degraded auditory stimuli (e.g., Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004;Lange, Thomas, Dana, & Dawes, 2011;Vokey & Read, 1985).…”

Section: Auditory Hindsight Biassupporting

confidence: 84%

Auditory hindsight bias: Fluency misattribution versus memory reconstruction.

Higham¹,

Neil²,

Bernstein³

2017

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Perfor

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We report 4 experiments investigating auditory hindsight bias -the tendency to overestimate the intelligibility of distorted auditory stimuli after learning their identity. An associative priming manipulation was used to vary the amount of processing fluency independently of prior target knowledge. For hypothetical designs, in which hindsight judgments are made for peers in foresight, we predicted that judgments would be based on processing fluency and that hindsight bias would be greater in the unrelated-compared to related-prime context (differential-fluency hypothesis). Conversely, for memory designs, in which foresight judgments are remembered in hindsight, we predicted that judgments would be based on memory reconstruction and that there would be independent effects of prime relatedness and prior target knowledge (recollection hypothesis). These predictions were confirmed.Specifically, we found support for the differential-fluency hypothesis when a hypothetical design was used in Experiments 1 and 2 (hypothetical group). Conversely, when a memory design was used in Experiments 2 (memory group), 3A and 3B, we found support for the recollection hypothesis. Together, the results suggest that qualitatively different mechanisms create hindsight bias in the two designs. The results are discussed in terms of fluency misattributions, memory reconstruction, anchoring-and-adjustment, sense making, and a multi-component model of hindsight bias.Keywords: auditory hindsight bias, fluency attributions, hypothetical design, memory design, associative priming AUDITORY HINDSIGHT BIAS 3 Statement of the Public Significance of the WorkThis study was aimed at uncovering the basic cognitive mechanisms of auditory hindsight bias, the finding that people informed about the content of a distorted audio signal prior to hearing it subsequently overestimate how objectively intelligible the signal actually is. The study suggests that the bias is not produced by a unitary cognitive mechanism, but is based on different mechanisms depending on whether one focuses on the past (i.e., trying to remember how intelligible a signal seemed earlier before learning the content) or on a hypothetical scenario (i.e., estimating how intelligible the signal would be for naïve others who are unaware of the content). Specifically, in the context of remembering, knowledge of content can distort how memories are reconstructed. Alternatively, in a hypothetical scenario, knowledge of content enhances perception of the signal which is not properly discounted when estimating for naïve others. AUDITORY HINDSIGHT BIAS 4Auditory Hindsight Bias: Fluency Misattributions versus Memory ReconstructionHindsight bias is a common judgment error that occurs when people who are knowledgeable of an outcome overestimate its probability. For example, the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001 might seem predictable to most of us now even though, prior to the attacks, many people did not expect them. Hindsight bias, first documented by Fischhoff in the 1970s (e.g.,...

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Section: Auditory Hindsight Biassupporting

confidence: 84%

Auditory hindsight bias: Fluency misattribution versus memory reconstruction.

Higham¹,

Neil²,

Bernstein³

2017

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Perfor

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“…A comparison of the gaze pattern of participants who listened to a non-native speaker with those who listened to a native speaker revealed that, indeed, participants were more attuned to the perspective of the director when she was a non-native speaker (Lev-Ari, Barr and Keysar, under review). This effect was found despite the fact that listening to non-native speakers imposes a cognitive load, and added cognitive load in general leads to worse perspective taking (Epley et al 2004). This study thus shows that adjustment in allocation of attention during language processing can have non-linguistic social consequences.…”

Section: Social Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 93%

Adjusting the Manner of Language Processing to the Social Context: Attention Allocation During Interactions with Non-native Speakers

Lev‐Ari¹

2015

Attention and Vision in Language Processing

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Models of language processing traditionally assume that we process the language of all speakers similarly, regardless of who they are. Thus, they assume that we will understand the sentence I just ate two pieces of pie using the same cues and reaching the same interpretation regardless of whether it was uttered by a young teenager, an elderly woman, our middle-aged neighbour or our non-native-speaking friend. Occasionally, there might be break downs in communication. For example, a language learner might select a suboptimal lexical item, using the sentence above, for example, to describe eating slices of a quiche, a cake or even two brownies. In these cases, we, as listeners, would note the error, and then correct it, inferring the meaning from the context. Importantly, the initial process of constructing a meaning out of the input is implicitly assumed to remain invariable, and the correction takes place after an incompatibility between the linguistic input and the context had been detected. More recent evidence, however, indicates that language processing is not invariable, but, in fact, adjusts to the situation. This evidence shows that the cues that listeners attend to during language processing might change according to the identity of the speaker. This chapter will review such evidence while focusing on evidence that shows that listeners' expectations of non-native speakers lead them to allocate less attention to linguistic cues and greater attention to contextual cues when processing the language of non-native speakers.

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“…Indeed, studies have found that enduring stressful, anxiety-inducing events-and the subjective experience of uncertainty that accompanies such events-can increase reliance on self-generated numeric anchors (Inbar & Gilovich, 2011; see also Kassam, Koslov, & Mendes, 2009). Given the substantial overlap in processes underlying adjustment from self-generated numeric anchors when making numeric judgments (Epley & Gilovich, 2001) and processes underlying adjustment from accessible self-knowledge when reasoning about others' mental states (Epley et al, 2004), it stands to reason that anxiety may operate similarly during mentalstate reasoning as when making numeric judgments.…”

Section: Anxiety and Mental-state Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anxious and egocentric: How specific emotions influence perspective taking.

Todd

Forstmann

Burgmer

et al. 2015

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

135

108

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People frequently feel anxious. Although prior research has extensively studied how feeling anxious shapes intrapsychic aspects of cognition, much less is known about how anxiety affects interpersonal aspects of cognition. Here, we examine the influence of incidental experiences of anxiety on perceptual and conceptual forms of perspective taking. Compared with participants experiencing other negative, high-arousal emotions (i.e., anger or disgust) or neutral feelings, anxious participants displayed greater egocentrism in their mental-state reasoning: They were more likely to describe an object using their own spatial perspective, had more difficulty resisting egocentric interference when identifying an object from others' spatial perspectives, and relied more heavily on privileged knowledge when inferring others' beliefs. Using both experimental-causal-chain and measurement-of-mediation approaches, we found that these effects were explained, in part, by uncertainty appraisal tendencies. Further supporting the role of uncertainty, a positive emotion associated with uncertainty (i.e., surprise) produced increases in egocentrism that were similar to anxiety. Collectively, the results suggest that incidentally experiencing emotions associated with uncertainty increase reliance on one's own egocentric perspective when reasoning about the mental states of others.

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Perspective Taking as Egocentric Anchoring and Adjustment.

Cited by 1,063 publications

References 48 publications

Auditory hindsight bias: Fluency misattribution versus memory reconstruction.

Auditory hindsight bias: Fluency misattribution versus memory reconstruction.

Adjusting the Manner of Language Processing to the Social Context: Attention Allocation During Interactions with Non-native Speakers

Anxious and egocentric: How specific emotions influence perspective taking.

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