Th is paper explores the moral underpinnings of education for sustainable development by studying the humanization of nature in contemporary teaching materials. To this end, Spinoza's and Freud's naturalistic psychological accounts-suggesting, among other things, that the human psychological constitution tends to further a reversed sense of causality-are invoked as resources for explaining the image of nature as portrayed in education for sustainable development. It is argued that the examples looked at rely on two problematic assumptions: (1) that there exists a metaphysical gulf between humanity and nature, and (2) that natural forces, like humans, act intentionally and therefore appear to be motivated by an underlying, albeit seemingly unexplainable, sense of teleology. To conclude, the humanization of nature in education for sustainable development is taken to make for a potential democratic problem insofar as the image of nature may be conceived as a powerful instrument for governing the everyday lives of people. Th at is, being able to infl uence the huma-nized image of nature also implies having a considerable degree of infl uence over the ways that people live. Nyckelord Spinoza, Freud, omvänd kausalitet, teleologi, förmänskligandet av naturen, psykologi, lärande för hållbar utveckling Introduktion Naturens krafter har alltid förefallit oförutsägbara och obegripligt mäktiga i relation till människans begränsade infl ytande. Ställd inför naturkatastrofer har människan, oavsett hur teknologiskt utvecklad hon varit, alltid upplevt sig vara mer eller mindre maktlös. Så tycks det alltid ha varit. Trots detta har människan hela tiden erbjudit motstånd snarare än kapitulerat inför denna till synes övermäktiga fi ende. Ett sätt att göra detta har varit genom att förse naturen med ett igenkännbart ansikte och att därmed göra naturen till en avbild av henne själv. 1 Att förmänskliga naturen genom olika populära bilder och berättelser kan beskrivas som ett försök att förstå och förutse någonting okänt genom att anpassa det till någonting mer välkänt. Eftersom människan, relativt sett, varit mer bekant med sin egen psykologiska

The authors propose that people adopt others' perspectives by serially adjusting from their own. As predicted, estimates of others' perceptions were consistent with one's own but differed in a manner consistent with serial adjustment (Study 1). Participants were slower to indicate that another's perception would be different from--rather than similar to--their own (Study 2). Egocentric biases increased under time pressure (Study 2) and decreased with accuracy incentives (Study 3). Egocentric biases also increased when participants were more inclined to accept plausible values encountered early in the adjustment process than when inclined to reject them (Study 4). Finally, adjustments tend to be insufficient, in part, because people stop adjusting once a plausible estimate is reached (Study 5).

Humans appear to reason using two processing styles: System 1 processes that are quick, intuitive, and effortless and System 2 processes that are slow, analytical, and deliberate that occasionally correct the output of System 1. Four experiments suggest that System 2 processes are activated by metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency during the process of reasoning. Incidental experiences of difficulty or disfluency--receiving information in a degraded font (Experiments 1 and 4), in difficult-to-read lettering (Experiment 2), or while furrowing one's brow (Experiment 3)--reduced the impact of heuristics and defaults in judgment (Experiments 1 and 3), reduced reliance on peripheral cues in persuasion (Experiment 2), and improved syllogistic reasoning (Experiment 4). Metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency appear to serve as an alarm that activates analytic forms of reasoning that assess and sometimes correct the output of more intuitive forms of reasoning.

People typically believe they are more likely to engage in selfless, kind, and generous behaviors than their peers, a result that is both logically and statistically suspect. However, this oft-documented tendency presents an important ambiguity. Do people feel "holier than thou" because they harbor overly cynical views of their peers (but accurate impressions of themselves) or overly charitable views of themselves (and accurate impressions of their peers)? Four studies suggested it was the latter. Participants consistently overestimated the likelihood that they would act in generous or selfless ways, whereas their predictions of others were considerably more accurate. Two final studies suggest this divergence in accuracy arises, in part, because people are unwilling to consult population base rates when predicting their own behavior but use this diagnostic information more readily when predicting others'. God, I thank thee that I am not like other men, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, or even like this tax collector. Luke 18:11, Revised Standard Version On February 7, 1998, at the dawn of what would become only the second presidential impeachment in American history, CBS News conducted a telephone poll asking Americans how interested they were in the steamy details of Bill Clinton's sex life. The results suggested they were not very interested. A scant 7% reported being "fascinated," and 50% reported being "completely disinterested." However, when asked to evaluate the interest of other Americans, 25% thought others were "fascinated" and only 18% thought others were "completely disinterested." Clearly, most people felt their own ambivalence was unique and that the hysteria surround

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