Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2020
DOI: 10.1145/3372297.3423359
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Phantom of the ADAS: Securing Advanced Driver-Assistance Systems from Split-Second Phantom Attacks

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
49
0

Year Published

2021
2021
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
5
4

Relationship

2
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 65 publications
(57 citation statements)
references
References 19 publications
0
49
0
Order By: Relevance
“…A recent work [32] demonstrates that they can mislead Tesla Model S to the adjacent lane by putting several small stickers on the road without the original lane line. Phantom attack [36] also demonstrates that they can mislead Tesla Model S by projecting fake lane lines from a drone in the nighttime. The drawing-lane-line attack is not as effective as the DRP attack based on our experience, but its vulnerability to this attack is more severe because of its ease of deployability.…”
Section: Physical-world Attacks For Automated Lane Centering Systemmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A recent work [32] demonstrates that they can mislead Tesla Model S to the adjacent lane by putting several small stickers on the road without the original lane line. Phantom attack [36] also demonstrates that they can mislead Tesla Model S by projecting fake lane lines from a drone in the nighttime. The drawing-lane-line attack is not as effective as the DRP attack based on our experience, but its vulnerability to this attack is more severe because of its ease of deployability.…”
Section: Physical-world Attacks For Automated Lane Centering Systemmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As future work, we suggest to test whether camera spoofing can be applied by embedding a traffic sign to an advertisement presented on a digital billboard in an invisible manner (e.g., by flashing the traffic sign for a split second) [11]. We also suggest examining whether the attack can be applied using infrared projection, exploiting the fact that a narrow spectrum of frequencies, the near infrared, is also captured by some CMOS sensors (this fact was exploited to establish an optical covert channel [12] and to break the confidentiality of FPV channel of commercial drones [13], [14]).…”
Section: Future Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Meanwhile, these defenses are not designed for arbitrarily large perturbations in a 3D environment. Moreover, even though the defense model proposed in [35] can defend against large perturbations in terms of 2D object classification, DoubleStar could evade such defense as it targets at attacking the 3D depth perception. Designing a defense model towards the 3D adversarial attacks will be our future work.…”
Section: Countermeasurementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The recent rise in the popularity of drones and self-driving vehicles helps drive OA's prevalence, while the potential risks of OA algorithms warrants further research. Although the community produced a wealth of security research on autonomous systems over the years [5,29,35,43,44,47,50,64], one sensing modality that is nearly omnipresent in modern OA, the stereo camera [61] (a.k.a., 3D depth camera), has mostly been overlooked. In this work, we expose the security risk of stereo cameras for the first time and propose a new attack, DoubleStar, which targets the depth estimation -one of the core functionalities of stereo cameras.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%