Phantoms of a Beleaguered Republic

The strongman presidency presents an acute threat to democracy. Two logics underpin its emergence, both of which implicate the administrative state. Under the first, presidents have sought to deploy the vast resources of the administrative state in pursuit of power and legacy. This logic is symmetric, shaping the behavior of Republican and Democratic presidents alike. The second logic, however, sets them apart. Because most of the administrative state is the embodiment of progressive values, Democratic presidents have approached presidential power in ways that are largely compatible with its well‐being, whereas Republican presidents have laid claim to increasingly extreme powers in order to retrench and sabotage it. Layered on the first, this asymmetric logic is the main driver of the strongman presidency—and, ultimately, a major threat to American democracy.

Section: The Symmetric Logic Of Presidential Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

The strongman presidency and the two logics of presidential power

Howell

Moe

2023

“…In contrast, some Trump administration officials felt that the president should adhere to the institutional norms and procedures that were developed in the presidency during the twentieth century. Skowronek et al (2021) characterize the institutional perspective as concerned with due process, procedural safeguards, informed decision making, and collective responsibility.…”

Section: The Deep Versus the Shallow Statementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition to the natural friction between presidential administrations and career civil servants, as is common in most administrations, the conflict between President Trump and his own appointees can be viewed as a clash between personal control and institutional continuity. Skowronek et al (2021) characterize President Trump's approach to the presidency as a “unitary executive” approach, which holds that individual presidents should have complete control of the executive branch (Crouch et al 2020; Pfiffner 2008, 219–22).…”

Section: The Deep Versus the Shallow Statementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Trump's confidence in his own instincts often led him to shut out or ignore his White House staff and cabinet secretaries, who thought that they were helping Trump achieve his policy goals by moderating his excesses and insisting on regular policy processes. But “the more the president's advisers enlisted regular processes to stave off unilateral action on Trump's preferred positions, the stronger his impulse became to shut down deliberations and to dictate decisions on his own authority” (Skowronek et al 2021, 68).…”

Section: The Deep Versus the Shallow Statementioning

confidence: 99%

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President Trump and the Shallow State: Disloyalty at the Highest Levels

Pfiffner¹

2022

President Donald Trump often complained about the "deep state" of career civil servants who, he asserted, were determined to undermine his presidency. But it was his own presidential appointees who most visibly resisted his directives. Political appointees are expected to be the most loyal advocates of a president's policy agenda, riding herd on the many bureaucracies of the executive branch. This article analyzes resistance to Trump's policy directives by his own appointees in the White House, cabinet, military, and intelligence community. It concludes that this level of resistance is unprecedented in the modern presidency.President Donald Trump often complained about the "deep state" of career civil servants who, he asserted, were determined to undermine his presidency. But it was his own presidential appointees who most visibly resisted his directives. Political appointees are expected to be the most loyal advocates of a president's policy agenda, riding herd on the many bureaucracies of the executive branch. Yet Trump's appointees in the White House, cabinet, military, and intelligence community refused to carry out many of the president's directives to an extent unprecedented in the modern presidency. President Trump's appointees went well beyond the normal disagreements about policy that characterize every administration; they resorted to slow-walking orders, refusing to comply with directives, and even outright sabotage (e.g., removing documents from the Resolute Desk in the Oval Office). Even Vice President Mike Pence, under Trump's pressure, refused to break the law when presiding over the formal counting of electoral votes on January 6, 2021. Leadership is central to the 573 Presidential Studies Quarterly

“…I argue that many of the difficulties Eisenhower encountered in trying to pass his preferred highway program are rooted in contradictions that are unintended design features of the presidential office Eisenhower inhabited. Building on recent scholarly efforts to tease out sources of presidential failure (e.g., Howell & Moe, 2020; Skowronek et al, 2021; Suri, 2017), I suggest that Eisenhower pursued a self‐defeating legislative strategy for highway expansion because he was in the grips of institutional and ideational forces that were the inheritance of past reforms and that were largely beyond his control. Specifically, Eisenhower developed a comprehensive highway program within his own White House without any congressional involvement—Republican or Democratic—before presenting his plan to Congress on a take‐it‐or‐leave‐it basis.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Historical Presidency: “Giving government to business”: Dwight Eisenhower and the Federal Highway Act

Zug

2023

Defenders of the modern presidency allege that Congress is ill‐equipped to design public policies adequate to a rapidly changing society. Because the president is positioned to use expertise to circumvent logrolling and horse trading—so goes this rationale—the presidency should effectively replace Congress as the polity's substantive legislator. Scholars have studied the advantages and pitfalls of this presidential model, but few have viewed the Eisenhower presidency through this lens. The case of the 1956 Federal Highway Act suggests that, like his predecessors, Eisenhower tried to supplant Congress as the polity's primary legislator. Further, seemingly self‐defeating decisions on Eisenhower's part can be helpfully interpreted as consequences of institutional and ideational forces beyond his control.