Phénoménologie de l’élément poétique

Richir, Marc

doi:10.7761/sp.8.177

Cited by 2 publications

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“…Far from being a reality (which is now), nor a possible reality (which will become), nor a reality which was in time, Richir explains this "Sache" as "purely virtual." By this he understands that which, comparable to the quantum mechanics, "without being present, being linked to the current by bias of the potential, however, does not exercise lesser real effects on the phenomenological field" (Richir, 2008, my translation adapted and italicized). The virtual is like an impossible possibility that shatters the poles of that which is currently present, even though it is itself not currently present.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…Sache means "thing" without telling us "what" stuff it is made of, wool or iron. It is for Richir a sort of concreteness (Richir, 2004(Richir, , 2008. 23 By this we understand a special kind of imitative and affective perception.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But this "figurable" part is the "object" "perceived" as transitional; it is the perceptive part. In the case of music, the "transitional object" is the sounds emitted by voices or instruments; in a novel, it is a "Bildsujet 21 " figured in the narrative; in poems, it is the more or less elements figuring the referents of language set out by the words (Richir, 2008). So for Richir, the "transitional object" has its figurable part which lies in the "perceptivity" of the "perceptive" phantasia.…”

Section: "Perception" Of the "Sache" In The "Perceptive" Phantasiamentioning

confidence: 99%

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Appreciation of Art as a Perception Sui Generis: Introducing Richir’s Concept of “Perceptive” Phantasia

Ekweariri

2021

Front. Psychol.

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In the Origin of the work of art, Heidegger claimed that the work of art opens to us the truth of Being, the opening of the world. Two problematics arise from this. First, his idea of “world-disclosure” evoked a sense of everydayness (which captures, for me, the idea of credulism in perception). Second, the senses of truth, Being, and world are metaphysically condensed. Hence the question: how then could the “truth of Being” or the “world” that artworks reveal be experienced? Among other ways (mimesis, imagination, perception, etc.) by which artworks are experienced, I choose to examine perception since it confirms this idea of everydayness. The questions that confront us to this effect are: can perception lead us into, to encounter, this world opened by artworks? Does the nervous/visual system suffice to enter into that world in which the artist invites us? This is where Richir becomes important. In response to the first problem, he shows that the “perception” (experience) of artworks is beyond mere everydayness since artworks open for us a world that “never was” and “never will be” (i.e., “virtuality” and not a veridical sense of everydayness as captured in the perceptive act that is object-related). This is because the material stuff or object given in perception is neutralized by the phantasia to become what Richir calls Sache. This Sache is in itself a phenomenon that is disclosed in artworks. In response to the second problem, Richir shows how artworks cannot disclose just metaphysical categories of Being, truth, or world. The disclosure has to be phenomenological, corporeal, and affective. He therefore proposes another mode of “perception” beyond mere perception in a revolutionary interpretation of the husserlian “perceptive” phantasia. With this, he shows how the aforementioned metaphysical condensations are liveable in experience. I concretize this with an illustration from the theater. Finally, I suggest participation as a phenomenological approach that can make both Heidegger’s and Richir’s intuitions meaningful.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: "Perception" Of the "Sache" In The "Perceptive" Phantasiamentioning

confidence: 99%

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Appreciation of Art as a Perception Sui Generis: Introducing Richir’s Concept of “Perceptive” Phantasia

Ekweariri

2021

Front. Psychol.

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“…39 Die gleiche Struktur setzt Husserl nun bezüglich des Bildbewusstseins voraus, nur ist hier der wesentliche Unterschied zu beachten, dass die Theateraufführung eigentlich nicht den Aufbau einer Bildvorstellung zeigt, da ihr eben der Charakter der Bildlichkeit fehlt. 40 Die dargestellte Person ist nicht ,,abgebildet'', sondern 38 Unlängst hat Marc Richir (2008) diese Husserlsche Beispielanalyse in Richtung auf Winnicotts ,,Ü bergangobjekte'' gedeutet. 39 All dies wird gewöhnlich sehr ungenau ausgedrückt in Sätzen wie: ,,im Theater (oder gleichermassen im Kino) wissen wir, dass das Gesehene nicht wirklich ist.''…”

Section: Die Doppelte Neutralitätunclassified

Gibt es perzeptive Phantasie? Als-ob-Bewusstsein, Widerstreit und Neutralität in Husserls Aufzeichnungen zur Bildbetrachtung

Ferencz-Flatz

2009

Husserl Stud

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Phénoménologie de l’élément poétique

Cited by 2 publications

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Appreciation of Art as a Perception Sui Generis: Introducing Richir’s Concept of “Perceptive” Phantasia

Appreciation of Art as a Perception Sui Generis: Introducing Richir’s Concept of “Perceptive” Phantasia

Gibt es perzeptive Phantasie? Als-ob-Bewusstsein, Widerstreit und Neutralität in Husserls Aufzeichnungen zur Bildbetrachtung

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