Phenomenology of Intuitive Judgment: Praecox-Feeling in the Diagnosis of Schizophrenia

Moskalewicz, Marcin; Schwartz, Michael; Gozé, Tudi

doi:10.26913/avant.2018.02.04

Cited by 15 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…We have speculated earlier following the New York study findings about the possible impact of expertise on PF, namely that the number of years spent in clinical practice would affect the belief in the rapid diagnosis and its reliability ( 7 ). In the Polish sample, however, the cut-off of 25 years of professional experience considered in the New York study does not bring any statistically significant differences regarding PF's presence, its perceived reliability, or any other tested variables.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Psychiatrists Report Praecox Feeling and Find It Reliable. A Cross-Cultural Comparison

et al. 2021

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Background: The psychopathological notion of the Praecox Feeling (PF) refers to an experience of strangeness and bizarreness that arises in a clinician during contact with a patient with schizophrenia. There is evidence that psychiatrists take advantage of this feeling in their diagnostic decisions despite the domination of an operationalized diagnostic approach.Methods: The article presents the results of a survey assessing the self-reported prevalence of the PF among psychiatrists in Poland and compares them with data from West Germany (1962), USA (1989), and France (2017) based on the same survey.Results: The study finds a consistent prevalence of reported feelings suggestive of the diagnosis of schizophrenia among psychiatrists of different cultural backgrounds and times. These feelings are independent of variables such as attitude toward schizophrenia, professional orientation, and professional experience and are considered reliable, even if not the most reliable, by the psychiatrists who have them. The study also finds that intersubjective phenomena, such as problematic affective attunement, gestures, and body language, are considered core to these feelings by the psychiatrists.Conclusions: The evidence confirms that psychiatrists' feelings about patients with schizophrenia are considered diagnostically relevant and calls for more deeply investigating the nature and diagnostic significance of these feelings. The article concludes with some speculations regarding the possible benefits of recognizing the PF in facilitating a psychotherapeutic encounter with psychotic patients.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Other authors have argued that PF is part of an implicit perceptual process, also called "Typification" (4,5), which allows us to grasp the singular mode of the self/world relationship. The theoretical issues of PF have been described elsewhere (6)(7)(8).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychiatrists Report Praecox Feeling and Find It Reliable. A Cross-Cultural Comparison

et al. 2021

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“…Such descriptions are not only informative for explanatory purposes but also for therapeutic and diagnostic practice (e.g. Moskalewicz et al 2018;Parnas et al 2005).…”

Section: Towards Functionalist Naturalizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenology and functional analysis. A functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology

Pokropski

2020

Phenom Cogn Sci

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In the article I discuss functionalist interpretations of Husserlian phenomenology. The first one was coined in the discussion between Hubert Dreyfus and Ronald McIntyre. They argue that Husserl’s phenomenology shares similarities with computational functionalism, and the key similarity is between the concept of noema and the concept of mental representation. I show the weaknesses of that reading and argue that there is another available functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology. I propose to shift perspective and approach the relation between phenomenology and functionalism from a methodological perspective, specifically taking into account the functionalist explanatory strategy called functional analysis. I discuss the notion of function in Husserl’s works and Husserl’s idea of functional phenomenology. The key argument I develop is that in functional phenomenology we can find an explanatory strategy which is analogous to the strategy of functional decomposition used in functional analysis. I conclude that the proposed functionalist reading of phenomenology opens a new approach to the integration of phenomenology with cognitive sciences.

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“…Grube's (2006) study looked at 67 previously unknown patients, all of whom displayed acute symptoms belonging to the schizophrenic spectrum. Compared with standardized diagnostic classification, the felt intensity of the praecox feeling was found to be a remarkably accurate diagnostic indicator of schizophrenia (see Varga 2013 andMoskalewicz et al 2018 for further discussion).…”

Section: Further Implications and Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It seems to me that something like this can happen in the clinical context, too. Again, for recent discussions of social-clinical perception and the diagnostic value of the praecox-feeling, see Moskalewicz et al (2018) and Varga (2013). phenomenological parts; nor am I suggesting that this view applies equally to all forms of mental disorders.…”

Section: Further Implications and Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enactivism, other minds, and mental disorders

Krueger

2019

Synthese

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Although enactive approaches to cognition vary in terms of their character and scope, all endorse several core claims. The first is that cognition is tied to action. The second is that cognition is composed of more than just in-the-head processes; cognitive activities are (at least partially) externalized via features of our embodiment and in our ecological dealings with the people and things around us. I appeal to these two enactive claims to consider a view called "direct social perception" (DSP): the idea that we can sometimes perceive features of other minds directly in the character of their embodiment and environmental interactions. I argue that if DSP is true, we can probably also perceive certain features of mental disorders as well. I draw upon the developmental psychologist Daniel Stern's notion of "forms of vitality"-largely overlooked in these debates-to develop this idea, and I use autism as a case study. I argue further that an enactive approach to DSP can clarify some ways we play a regulative role in shaping the temporal and phenomenal character of the disorder in question, and it may therefore have practical significance for both the clinical and therapeutic encounter.

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Phenomenology of Intuitive Judgment: Praecox-Feeling in the Diagnosis of Schizophrenia

Cited by 15 publications

References 29 publications

Psychiatrists Report Praecox Feeling and Find It Reliable. A Cross-Cultural Comparison

Psychiatrists Report Praecox Feeling and Find It Reliable. A Cross-Cultural Comparison

Phenomenology and functional analysis. A functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology

Enactivism, other minds, and mental disorders

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