Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection

Schwitzgebel, Eric; Cushman, Fiery

doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.04.015

Cited by 157 publications

(73 citation statements)

References 36 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Huerta et al (2012) describe this phenomenon as preferences developing by experience. Nevertheless, even expertise in the field does not automatically guarantee a reduction in the framing bias, as it is shown by Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2015), whose findings mostly contradict the ones above. They mention Mandel's (2014) argument that participants in the Asian disease experiment can read the option "200 people to be saved" as "at least 200 people will be saved" (perhaps more) and comparable "400 people die" as "at least 400 people die", leading to the choices of participants that are different than expected.…”

Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 50%

“…Based on a number of the studies, it clearly seems that experience and personal engagement diminish the effect of framing on decision making. On the other hand, it is important to note contrasting findings by Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2015) who test the impact of framing bias in an Asian disease problem-like experiment. In the experiment, they compare the answers of philosophers with years of experience in the field with "non-professionals" (people with a similar level of education but from other fields) and prove a presence of framing bias and risk-aversion among participants from the philosophers' group.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Framing and Bias: A Literature Review of Recent Findings

Beratšová

Krchová

Gažová

et al. 2018

CEJM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Framing bias is an individual decision-making misconception caused by the fact that a person interprets the surrounding world according to a decision frame chosen by her or his subjective opinion. This article aims to review various kinds of factors that cause and affect framing or lead to debiasing, i.e. a decrease in the resulting framing bias. The objective of the study is carried out using a literature review that analyzes recent empirical studies. As a result, numerous factors are identified that according to the studies have an impact on framing. It transpires that four broader groups of these factors can be established -decision situation setup (amount of information, additional presentation of options), experience (knowledge, engagement), effort (attention, complexity, the amount of information to process) and demographics (gender, nationality).

show abstract

Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 50%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Framing and Bias: A Literature Review of Recent Findings

Beratšová

Krchová

Gažová

et al. 2018

CEJM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…More dramatically in the subfield of moral philosophy, one of the very intellectual arenas that just scream for political controversy, the expertise of professional philosophers as sources of better intuitions has been questioned [47]. Under an experimental setting, while reasoning about moral dilemmas, professional moral philosophers have displayed significantly more susceptibility to framing effects (bias related to irrelevant differences in the presentation of a problem) than professional non-philosophers [48].…”

Section: Political-ideological Bias In Contemporary Western Philosophymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Unreasonable Destructiveness of Political Correctness in Philosophy

Doria¹

2017

Philosophies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I submit that epistemic progress in key areas of contemporary academic philosophy has been compromised by politically correct ("PC") ideology. First, guided by an evolutionary account of ideology, results from social and cognitive psychology and formal philosophical methods, I expose evidence for political bias in contemporary Western academia and sketch a formalization for the contents of beliefs from the PC worldview taken to be of core importance, the theory of social oppression and the thesis of anthropological mental egalitarianism. Then, aided by discussions from contemporary epistemology on epistemic values, I model the problem of epistemic appraisal using the frameworks of multi-objective optimization theory and multi-criteria decision analysis and apply it to politically correct philosophy. I conclude that philosophy guided by politically correct values is bound to produce constructs that are less truth-conducive and that spurious values which are ideologically motivated should be abandoned. Objections to my framework stemming from contextual empiricism, the feminine voice in ethics and political philosophy are considered. I conclude by prescribing the epistemic value of empirical adequacy, the contextual value of political diversity and the moral virtue of moral courage to reverse unwarranted trends in academic philosophy due to PC ideology.

show abstract

“…Typically these framing e ects are order e ects. For example, there are numerous studies which find that participants' intuitions about various cases are sensitive to which cases they considered beforehand (Lanteri et al, 2008;Lombrozo, 2009;Nichols and Mallon, 2006;Petrinovich and O'Neill, 1996;Schwitzgebel and Cushman, 2015;Wiegmann et al, 2012). However, there are other types of framing e ects which have been claimed to a ect moral intuitions and philosophical intuitions more widely, e.g., how vividly a case is presented (Bartels, 2008), whether a case is high a ect or low a ect (Nichols and Knobe, 2007), how mechanistically/psychologically cases are described (Nahmias et al, 2007), the presence of unconscious cleanliness cues (Tobia et al, 2013), or even what typeface a case is presented in (Tobia, 2012;Weinberg et al, 2012, who cites the unpublished Gonnerman et al 2011).…”

Section: The Unreliability Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions

Andow

2016

Philosophical Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing e ects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing e ects does not show that moral intuitions have a unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we have, the e ect of framing on the strength of those intuitions still needs to be taken into account. I argue that this by itself poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy.

show abstract

Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection

Cited by 157 publications

References 36 publications

Framing and Bias: A Literature Review of Recent Findings

Framing and Bias: A Literature Review of Recent Findings

The Unreasonable Destructiveness of Political Correctness in Philosophy

Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About