Philosophic history and common culture in Gellner's theory of nationalism

Abstract

Ernest Gellner's work on nationalism is situated in a larger social metaphysic and philosophical anthropology. This paper investigates some of these overarching intellectual commitments and their implications for his arguments about nationalism. Two main issues are examined. Does the method of ‘philosophic history’ provide any philosophical or methodological support for his treatment of nationalism? What are the implications of the common culture of industrial civilization for his arguments about nationalism? Addressing these issues together contributes to the continuing evaluation of Gellner's work, particularly to recent discussion of his arguments about necessity and nationalism.

The importance of being Ernest: a Comment on Riga and Hall

“…There is misdirection in Professors Riga's and Hall's (: 384) comment on my work on Ernest Gellner's theory of nationalism (Meadwell ). My argument in that piece, and subsequent articles (Meadwell , ), is not about functionalism, as they claim. I noted this explicitly:…”

“…My purpose in this piece, and the others that followed, was primarily to examine the concept of necessity and how Gellner used this concept in his theoretical writing on nationalism. As I pointed out (Meadwell : 271), I was not aware of any sustained examination of this conceptual part of his arguments, despite the apparent importance it played in them. Paying attention to how he used this concept is more faithful to what Gellner was doing theoretically, and more revealing, than repeating arguments about functionalism.…”

“…‘Necessity’ is a concept with an independent and important place in the history of philosophy and analytic philosophy quite separate from functionalism. The concept of necessity is threaded through his work, including his early arguments (Gellner ; Meadwell : 271), his central text on nationalism (Gellner, ), and he returned to it in the opening pages of his posthumously published book (Gellner, : 5 ff. ; Meadwell : 278–279).…”

“…The concept of necessity is threaded through his work, including his early arguments (Gellner ; Meadwell : 271), his central text on nationalism (Gellner, ), and he returned to it in the opening pages of his posthumously published book (Gellner, : 5 ff. ; Meadwell : 278–279). It is used explicitly and repeatedly by Gellner, much more so than ‘function’ or cognate concepts and, for these reasons, formed the primary focus of my discussion.…”

“…I took a more sociological tack and addressed the relationship between Gellner's definition of nationalism and his own application of that definition (Meadwell ). I examined problems with his treatment of the common culture of modernity (Meadwell ). I raised questions about Gellner's understanding of nationalism as a principle of political legitimacy.…”