The central distinguishing feature of Ernest Gellner's most important treatment of nationalism is the proposition that nationalism is necessary for industrial society. Relatively little attention has been paid to the philosophical dimension of this proposition. The question of necessity in social explanation, however, is a complicated philosophical problem and must be dealt with directly if this proposition is to be endorsed. I argue that Gellner's argument is philosophically flawed. The ‘ordinary prose’ of Nations and Nationalism fails to deliver what Gellner claims to have delivered: the demonstration of a necessary connection between nationalism and industrial society. This result is of particular relevance given Gellner's philosophical interests.

The central argument of this article is straightforward. (1) The contemporary Quebec nationalist movement has moved through phases of mobilization, demobilization, and remobilization. (2) Interpretations of Quebec nationalism do not successfully explain all three phases. (3) A new model of mobilization can provide a more satisfactory account. The goal is to construct a model that is useful for all three phases and that can say something about nationalism and political mobilization more generally.

The work of Ernest Gellner continues to be an influential part of nationalism studies. A recent appraisal has raised questions about the argument that Gellner offered in his central text on nationalism, Nations and Nationalism. This article takes up other issues in Gellner's work on nationalism. The article examines Gellner's influential definition of nationalism and the interpretation that he placed on that definition, as well as his treatment of ‘political cohabitation’. It also pays more attention to Gellner's later work, namely, Gellner's discussion of ‘the time zones of nationalism’. The paper draws on secondary literature but its primary purpose is to assess the coherence of Gellner's arguments.

Abstract. Are nationalism and international economic integration irreconcilable? This paper explores the theoretical connections between these two phenomena and develops a framework to assess the implications of international economic integration for nationalist movements in the developed West. We focus upon the structural context of nationalism in democratic societies, emphasising the impact of changes in the international political economy and the influence of domestic institutions. Although the demand for secession may not stem from economic calculations, the expected costs and benefits of independence are constraints to nationalist mobilisation and are conditioned by the structure of the international political economy. We identify three ideal types of international structures and discuss how the strategies and prospects of nationalist movements are shaped within each of them. We find that a structure of ‘institutionalised interdependence’ is most conducive to nationalist mobilisation in a liberal democratic context, but the impact of economic integration depends largely upon conditions defined by domestic institutional structures.

No abstract