Gellner redux?

Abstract

The work of Ernest Gellner continues to be an influential part of nationalism studies. A recent appraisal has raised questions about the argument that Gellner offered in his central text on nationalism, Nations and Nationalism. This article takes up other issues in Gellner's work on nationalism. The article examines Gellner's influential definition of nationalism and the interpretation that he placed on that definition, as well as his treatment of ‘political cohabitation’. It also pays more attention to Gellner's later work, namely, Gellner's discussion of ‘the time zones of nationalism’. The paper draws on secondary literature but its primary purpose is to assess the coherence of Gellner's arguments.

Philosophic history and common culture in Gellner's theory of nationalism

“…This discussion now can be used to provide some support for an argument that has been made (Meadwell ) about Gellner's treatment of ‘political cohabitation’. In that earlier discussion, I have argued that Gellner's argument actually depends on a criterion of legitimacy that is independent of nationalism – the principle of impartiality.…”

“…This may seem to be quite overdrawn, yet this understanding of the nation is simply Gellner's position on nationalism in the modern world reworked as a definition of the nation. And that position, without rehearsing it in detail (for elaboration, see Meadwell , ) is that nationalism is fated to prevail because nationalism is inherent in the social conditions of industrial society. And, thus, as a consequence, the world is fated to be organized in a fundamental way into nations.…”

“…Nonetheless, this position implies, if not entails, that the nation is the fundamental bedrock, not merely of cultural, but also of social organization (cf. Meadwell : 29–30). Nations are the building blocks of the modern world.…”

“…This claim is the proposition that nationalism is necessary for industrial society. A subsequent article (Meadwell ) examined Gellner's work from a more standard sociological point of view. Two arguments were presented in this piece, namely that Gellner limits nationalism to the experience of the politically dominated and, secondly, that Gellner is not able to make good his claim that nationalism is a principle of political legitimation.…”

“…I offer, though, some comments by way of accounting for the change. The first takes seriously what I proposed (Meadwell : 32–33) elsewhere. One explanation is simply the presence of a kind of hubris.…”