Philosophical implications of neuroscience: The space for a critique

Abstract

In an intellectual atmosphere still marked by the ideological failures of the twentieth century, the expectations for neuroscience are extremely high, even in fields traditionally sheltered from the seductions of neurobiological explanations, such as political theory, sociology and philosophy. In an attempt to problematize the reception that this neuroscientific vocabulary has received, I provide in this article a cartography of three major lines of philosophical criticism of neuroscience -'conceptual', 'societal' and 'embodied-enactive' -put forward recently by philosophers of different intellectual traditions. Although these criticisms are important in shedding light on some epistemological inconsistencies of the neuroscientific programme, the need remains to supplement this philosophical work with a different kind of critique, one that could address more directly the social and political relevance of neuroscience as well understand our epoch's urge to 'turn neurobiological' previously cultural or sociological phenomena.

Neuro-Enhancement Practices across the Lifecourse: Exploring the Roles of Relationality and Individualism

“…An enduring critique of contemporary neuroscience has been that by focusing its gaze inside the human skull, neuroscience perpetuates individualistic modes of explanation (Maasen and Sutter, 2007;Gergen, 2010;Meloni, 2011;Canter, 2012;Joldersma, 2016). Critical theorists' attention has been particularly drawn to the field of neuro-enhancement, due to the parallels between the concept of neuro-plasticity and the neoliberal values of flexibility, mobility, and adaptability (Malabou, 2008;Choudhury et al, 2009;Pitts-Taylor, 2010;Ortega, 2011;Papadopoulos, 2011).…”

The ‘First Three Years’ Movement and the Infant Brain: A Review of Critiques

“…Diane M. Beck () concludes that the power of brain imaging in the popular press resides in the simplicity of the message it conveys and the belief that images ‘prove’ behavioural connections that we already think are true (Beck , 763). Connors and Singh () suggest that fMRI images have a ‘seeming transparency’ and ‘lay interpretability’, whilst Meloni () says the turn towards neuroscience and ‘the proliferation of references to our neurobiological dimension’ reflects a search for moral foundations and ‘deeply interacts with our societies' cultural needs and expectations’ (Meloni , 310). Fine's critique of the neuro‐fixing of gender differences highlights the conservative effects of brain claims:

The answer, ‘Oh, it's the brain ,’ offers a tidy justification for accepting the status quo with clear conscience.

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Ciencia, Teoría Social y Cuerpo en el Giro Afectivo: Esferas de Articulación

“…Por lo tanto, los sentimientos siempre están escondidos, como ocurre necesariamente con todas las imágenes mentales, invisibles a todos los que no sean su legitimo dueño, pues son la propiedad más privada del organismo en cuyo cerebro tienen lugar (Damasio, 2003a). Las emociones en cambio, sugiere Damasio, son acciones o 20 Maurizio Meloni (2011) proporciona una revisión profunda de las articulaciones generadas entre la «teoría social» y las neurociencias en los últimos años, así como una discusión sobre las principales críticas que las neurociencias han recibido por parte de las ciencias sociales. 21 Para echar un vistazo a la diversidad de las perspectivas dentro del campo de las neurociencias afectivas se puede ver el número especial Affective Neuroscience (Schmidt, 2003) de la revista Brain and Cognition.…”