Physical layer security with hostile jammers and eavesdroppers: Secrecy transmission capacity

Si, Chenzhi; Sun, Hongguang; Sheng, Min; Wang, Xijun; Li, Jiandong

doi:10.1109/pimrc.2016.7794718

Cited by 5 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…For simplicity, we assume that the EV attacks one UE noting that the corresponding analysis can be extended to the case of attacking multiple UEs. In contrast to some of the existing works that introduce pilot spoofing and jamming by two separate nodes [21], we assume a single FD EV performing concurrent pilot spoofing and jammingchannel estimation which introduces a new challenge in analyzing correlated spoofing and jamming self-interferences.…”

Section: System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Concurrent Spoofing-Jamming Attack in Massive MIMO Systems With a Full-Duplex Multi-Antenna Eavesdropper

Alageli

Ikhlef

Chambers

2023

IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol.

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In this paper, we evaluate the ultimate severity of a concurrent spoofing-jamming un-detected attack from a fullduplex (FD) multi-antenna eavesdropper (EV) on a legitimate user equipment (UE) in a massive multiple-input multipleoutput (MIMO) system. The FD EV can concurrently exploit its antennas to spoof one UE pilot and to estimate its link to the same UE in the uplink, and then to eavesdrop the UE's data and perform directional jamming in the downlink. From the perspective of the EV, we derive an expression for the ergodic rate difference, which is general for any possible overlap between spoofing and jamming antenna subsets. Residual spoofing and jamming self-interferences and their statistical dependencies are accounted for in the derived expression. The EV optimizes the trade-off between both spoofing-jamming powers, and antenna subsets to minimize the ergodic rate difference. Numerical results show that the EV is capable of destroying the security of the legitimate communication with a small number of antennas and a power budget equal to that of the attacked UE. The severity of the attack depends on the EV's knowledge of the power allocation strategies used at the base station (BS).

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Section: System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Concurrent Spoofing-Jamming Attack in Massive MIMO Systems With a Full-Duplex Multi-Antenna Eavesdropper

Alageli

Ikhlef

Chambers

2023

IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol.

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“…where a −i represents the configuration of all other players except player i, and P n safe (I n ) is the secrecy probability of MUE on subchannel n, the expression of which is given in (9). We can see from the definition that the utility of a player i means the incremental marginal contribution it makes based on its priority.…”

Section: State Transition Function P(a X)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are mainly two branches in the research of PLS, one of which is performance analyzing. The derivation of secrecy outage probability, connection outage probability or the secrecy probability have been progressed from point to point scenes (Alice and Bob with an eavesdropper) under different channel conditions to multi-node deployments like ad hoc [9] and relay [10] networks. The secrecy performance analysis of a heterogeneous network under certain access or jammer selection strategies have started to appear lately [11], [12], in which stochastic geometry plays a vital role in modeling the randomness and heterogeneity of the network.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Consequently, the cdf of natural secrecy probability isF z (x) = 1 − e −φx . (43)From(9) and (43) it can be deduced thatW n ({i}) − W n (∅) = 1 − ϕ i e −φσ 2 (ϕ i + φ) − 1 − e −φσ 2 = φ ϕ i + φ e −φσ 2 .(44)II. When |S| 2, W n (S)−W n (S\{i}) can be written as (45), as shown at the bottom of this page.Then define the sequence {b n }, where b n =…”

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confidence: 99%

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Physical-Layer-Security-Oriented Frequency Allocation in Ultra-Dense-Networks Based on Location Informations

Zhang

Wang

2019

IEEE Access

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In this paper, we investigate location-based frequency allocation schemes in a two-layer ultra-dense network (UDN) with a wideband eavesdropper to efficiently enhance the macro layer security in the whole working bandwidth. The cross-tier interference, treated as evil by traditional wisdom, is employed to confuse the malicious node as well as to tackle the conflict between the secrecy and traditional performances through the prudent spectrum allocation among the small cells. Three games are designed to progressively give insight into the frequency assignment problems under increasingly strict scenes. With the help of game theoretic stochastic learning approaches and location information, small cell base stations (SBSs) are endowed with the ability to distributedly select the subchannel with no requirement on the eavesdropper's CSI. First, more specifically, we focus on the security problem, aiming to promote the safety transmission of macro users by leveraging a state field, and thus formulate the spectrum selection of SBSs as a state-based potential game, which guarantees a budget-balanced utility design. The existence of a recurrent state equilibrium point is proved, and that it is able to maximize the total safety transmission probability of all subchannels. A step forward, we take the service delay of SBSs into consideration, nowadays, as numerous new services are delay-sensitive. To this end, an exact potential game, in which the equilibrium always exists, is built to help SBSs strike a balance between altruistically helping the macro users and selfishly keeping their own performances. Furthermore, a fully distributed non-cooperative game that requires no exchange among SBSs is put forward. The proposed scheme may work well even when the backhaul is limited or even unavailable since all the SBSs only depend on the observation of their own instantaneous performances. Finally, the numerical results validate the effectiveness of the proposed games on improving the safety transmission probability while guaranteeing a better service within small cells. INDEX TERMS Ultra-dense networks, physical layer security, delay, state-based game, reinforcement learning.

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“…In the papers [5]- [8] the degrading security concerns in military operations based on wireless communication, jamming based physical layer security prospects and particular environmental reliability challenges incorporated in sensor networks are reported respectively. The paper presented in [8] documents an innovative anti-deception jamming method for radar sensor networks whereas in [9] a detailed perspective analysis of the secrecy transmission capacity of hostile jammers is articulated. The paper presented in [10] describes a novel outage-based characterization approach for joint relay and jammer selection scheme in case of channel state information feedback delays.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Cyber-Vigilance System for Anti-Terrorist Drives Based on an Unmanned Aerial Vehicular Networking Signal Jammer for Specific Territorial Security

Chowdhury¹,

Sarkar²,

Haider³

2018

Adv. sci. technol. eng. syst. j.

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During sudden anti-terrorist drives conducted by the law enforcement agencies, a localized cyber security system happens to be a special tactic to avert the unprecedented massacre and gruesome fatalities against the residents of that area by disconnecting the affected territory from the rest of the world; so that the militants and their outside accomplices cannot communicate with each other and also the terrorists cannot go through the ongoing apprehensive operation via wireless communications. This paper presents a novel framework of an unmanned aerial vehicular networking signal jammer which is oriented to block incoming and outgoing signals of all frequencies transmitted from a specifically marginalized territory scanned and explored by the aerial vehicle. During such a cyber-vigilance operation, the aerial vehicle is equipped with a transmitter and an auto-tuning band-pass filter module with automatic regulation of center frequencies according to the surrounding networking signals, which are considered to be the suppressing noise parameters. In order to restrict the signal blocking operation within the militant hub, the aerial vehicle with the network terminator is controlled to navigate within a particular boundary of a residential area and its navigation is continuously mapped and stored for effective evacuation process directed to save the innocent stranded people. A very low frequency (VLF) metal detector has been designed to trace the explosives and buried landmines inside the exploration arena. An algorithm for 3-D mapping of the metal traces detected by the aerial navigator has been presented in this paper. Signal blocking, metal tracing and stable confined movements have been tested where the testbed is provided with signals of different frequencies along with variation in dimensions of the testing region to evaluate the reliability of the proposed framework.

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Physical layer security with hostile jammers and eavesdroppers: Secrecy transmission capacity

Cited by 5 publications

References 13 publications

Concurrent Spoofing-Jamming Attack in Massive MIMO Systems With a Full-Duplex Multi-Antenna Eavesdropper

Concurrent Spoofing-Jamming Attack in Massive MIMO Systems With a Full-Duplex Multi-Antenna Eavesdropper

Physical-Layer-Security-Oriented Frequency Allocation in Ultra-Dense-Networks Based on Location Informations

A Cyber-Vigilance System for Anti-Terrorist Drives Based on an Unmanned Aerial Vehicular Networking Signal Jammer for Specific Territorial Security

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